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COGNOVIT JUDGMENTS: AN IGNORED
PROBLEM OF DUE PROCESS AND
FULL FAITH AND CREDIT
DAN HO ON, JR.t
Joe Little, a Tonganoxie, Kansas, farmer, borrowed money, by mail, from
the Friendly Finance Company of Columbus, Ohio. Later Friendy got a
judgment in Ohio and sued Joe on the judgment in Kansas. "How come
asked Joe. "'ve paid that note." Joe's lawyer replied: "I'm sorry, Joe, but
you'll probably have to pay again. You signed a note with a cognovit clause
down in the fine print. Even though the note was paid, the cognovit let
Friendly sue you in Ohio without telling you. Now Kansas will lave to go
along with the Ohio judgment." "But that's not fair," said Joe. "There-
ought-to-be-a-law!"'
MECAN COURTS have traditionally found a defendant subject to in per-
sonam jurisdiction in two situations: when he was personally served
while voluntarily within the territory of the court, or when he volun-
tarily consented to the court's power. Consent, normally found in a cognovit
clause or warrant of attorney, 2 has a long and honored history. But the time
has come to re-evaluate this jurisdictional doctrine in the light of the recent
advances in conflict of laws thinking.
With International Shoe Co. v. Washington3 the United States Supreme
Court indicated a willingness to accept new ideas as to the limitation of the
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Kansas. A.B., 1951, LL.B., 1953, University
of Kansas; LL.M., 1954, Yale University.
I See, e.g., Hazel v. Jacobs, 78 N.J.L. 459,75 AtL. 903 (1910). Contra, First Nat'l Baik v.
Cunningham, 48 Fed. 510 (D. Ky. 1891).
2 For an excellent discussion of these terms and the legal history of cognovit notes, see
General Contract Purchase Corp. v. Max Keil Real Estate Co., 35 DeL 531, 170 AtL 797
(Del. Super. Ct. 1933); First Nat'l Bank v. White, 220 Mo. 717, 120 S.W. 36 (1909); Note,
102 U. PA. L. Rnv. 524-28 (1954). The terms will be used interchangeably here.
There is considerable variation from state to state and from finance company to finance
company on the typical wording of a cognovit clause. One reads: "The undersigned and each
of them hereby authorized any attorney at law to appear in any Court of Record in the State
of Ohio or in the United States, after this note becomes due under any of its conditions and
waive the issuance and service of process and confess a judgment against the undersigned or
any of them in favor of the legal holder hereof for the amount then appearing due hereon,
together with actual court costs upon the entry of judgment, and thereupon to release all
error and waive all right of appeal." This language is taken from the Ohio small loan form
currently used by the General Acceptance Corporation, Allentown, Pennsylvania.
Other forms were supplied the author by attorneys in the finance industry. While the
actual wording differs extensively, the basic coverage is the same.
3 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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due process clause4 on in personam jurisdiction. No longer need state courts
and legislatures find in personam jurisdiction through contorted fictions of
"6presence" or "implied consent" arising out of "doing business" 5 or "danger-
ous instrumentalities."6 Taking into account the changed facts of the business
world, the Court granted freedom to the state to use as a test of in personam
jurisdiction: "The quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and
orderly administration of the laws. .. "7 and "an 'estimate of the incon-
veniences.' "8 State courts and legislatures responded slowly at first, but with
later encouragement from the United States Supreme Court,9 have protected
the plaintiff's ability to sue in his own home state with increasing vigor.10
But does the new enlightenment-an enlightenment that says a technical,
lawyer-only concept like in personam jurisdiction must follow the change in
business practices of nationwide corporations-suggest the possibility of new
restrictions on the defendant's liability to suit away from home?1 In other
words, are changes also due in the consent area?
4 U.S. CoNr. amend. XIV, § 1: "[No state shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law.. .. "
5 People's Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. 79 (1918); Philadelphia &
R. Ry. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264 (1917); International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234
U.S. 579 (1914); Green v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry., 205 U.S. 530 (1907).
6 Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
7 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
8Id. at 317, quoting from Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir.
1930). For another wording see RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CoNeLicr OF LAws § 74 (Tent.
Draft No. 3, 1956): "A state has judicial jurisdiction over a person if the person's relation-
ship to the state is such as to make the exercise ofjudicial jurisdiction reasonable." Comment
b states: "[A] state does not have jurisdiction in the absence of some reasonable basis for
exercising it.... The principle cannot be defined more precisely than in terms of reasonable-
ness or, following the lead of the Supreme Court of the United States, of'fair play and sub-
stantial justice.' "
9 See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); But see Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
1o See IL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (1959); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 303.13 (3) (Supp. 1958);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 21-3-16 (Supp. 1959); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (4) (Supp.
1960); WASH. Riv. CODE § 4.28.185 (Supp. 1959); Wis. Sess. Laws, 1959, ch. 226, § 15,
amending Wis. STAT. §§ 262.05, 262.06 (1957). Other states are interpreting old statutes to
arrive at approximately the same result. See, e.g., Heury R. Jahn & Son v. Superior Court,
49 Cal. 2d 855,323 P.2d 437 (1958); Jarrard Motors Inc. v. Jackson Auto & Supply Co., 237
Miss. 660, 115 So. 2d 309 (1960). For a discussion of how far this new approach may go, see
Symposium, Transient.Jurisdiction-Remnant ofPennoyer v. Neff: A Round Table, 9 J. PuB. L.
281 (1960).
11 A few souls, not as timid as others, have suggested that the United States Supreme
Court might abandon or actually has abandoned the first basis-physical power-the specter
of the sheriff boarding the airplane, summons in hand. Professor Ehrenzweig is the chief
proponent of this view. See EHRENZWEIG, CoNFIucT OF LAWS. PART ONE: JURISDICTION AND
JunoMEN-s § 30 (1959) [hereinafter cited as EHRENZWEiG]. See also Schlesinger, Methods
of Progress in Conflict of Laws, Some Comments on Ehrenzweig's Treatment of "Transient"
Jurisdiction, 9 J. PuB. L. 313 (1960).
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The later conflicts texts reiterate the traditional learning that in a free so-
ciety the Constitution does not prohibit, either prior to or after suit is filed, a
defendant from agreeing to have a court hear the plaintiff's case and to allow
such hearing without any notice to the defendant.12 The tentative second edi-
tion of the Restatement of Conflict ofLaws sees no problem in consent jurisdic-
tion.13
The text writers point out that there are some problems, e.g., determining
the extent of the consent, but such problems are treated as minor,14 although
most casebooks on conflict of laws include one hard cognovit case."5
Although these cases always seemed intriguing, the text writers were com-
forting. Two recent articles, however, have prompted this inquiry. Professor
Paulsen argued in the Iowa Law Review' 6 that an F2 court, in a consent case,
should treat Fl's'7 choice of law rule as jurisdictional when the plaintiff asked
F2 to give full faith and credit 8 to the F1 judgment. A comment on state
court jurisdiction appearing in the Harvard Law Review was the second ar-
ticle.1 9 There the editors of the Review, in their excellent student symposium
on the current status of constitutional jurisdiction in state courts, without the
citation of precedent,20 said of cognovit clauses: "The waiver of notice provi-
sion, moreover, may render enforcement of the notes unconstitutional." 2'
12 EmNI, G § 27, at 89; GOODRICH, CoNrucr oF LAws § 73, at 196 (3d ed. 1949)
[hereinafter cited as GOODRICH]; LEIMR, TiM LAw OF CONFLICr OF LAws, § 29 (1959)
[hereinafter cited as LE..AR]; STumBmRG, PRINCirLES OF CoNFLIcr OF LAws 81 (2d ed. 1951)
[hereinafter cited as STumEERG].
1 REsrATEMNT (SECoND), CONFLICT OF LAws § 81 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1956): "A state
has judicial jurisdiction over an individual who has consented to the exercise of such juris-
diction within limitations determined by the scope of the consent." See also comments d, h,
and k. The lack of notice does not bother the RrYATEmNT either. See § 75, comment g.
14 See note 12 supra.
Is The case of Hazel v. Jacobs, 78 N.J.L. 459, 75 At. 903 (1910), appears in IORENzEN,
CoNFLcrs OF LAws 40 (6th ed. 1951), and STUmERO, CONFLICr OF LAWS 19 (1956). The
case of Egley v. Bennett & Co., 196 Ind. 50, 145 N.E. 830 (1924), appears in CHEAtIAM,
GOODRICH, G~iswoLD & RzEsE, COrmuc'r OF LAws 111 (4th ed. 1957). The case of Jones v.
Turner, 249 Mich. 403, 228 N.W. 796 (1930), appears in HARPER, TAINToR, CARNAHAN &.
BROWN, CONFICT OF LAws 672 (1950).
16 Paulsen, Enforcing the Money Judgment ofa Sister State, 42 IowA L. Rnv. 202, 209-12
(1957).
17 "Fl" is the traditional conflicts shorthand referring to the state where the original
judgment was entered. "F2" refers to the state where the plaintiff seeks to enforce his judg-
ment.
Is See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may
by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be
proved, and the Effect thereof." Congress has implemented this clause. 62 Stat. 947 (1948),
28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1958).
19 Developments in the Law-State Cort Jurisdiction, 73 HARv. L. Rav. 909 (1960).
2o Surely an unusual practice at the Harvard Law Review.
21 Develotments in the Law, supra note 19, at 944.
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There was also a nagging suspicion that while consent raised interesting
theoretical arguments on due process jurisdiction, due process notice, and the
requirements of full faith and credit, it might not present much of a practical
problem. With the extensive statutory restriction on cognovits, 22 it was pos-
sible that consent, as typified by cognovit clauses, was not being used to any
degree by the finance industry.
Further, although consent as a basis of jurisdiction is usually discussed in
the abstract as though the law dealt with two large and relatively equal parties,
undoubtedly a huge percentage of such consents appear as a cognovit clause in
a note given by a borrower to a bank or finance company. If true, the use of
and- commercial need for cognovit jurisdiction was relevant to any determina-
tion of fair play and substantial justice. Certainly, industrial knowledge and
experience would be indispensible for any meaningful discussion of the exist-
ing doctrine or of proposed improvements. Therefore, industry attorneys and
executives who had day to day experience with the use of cognovit clauses
were contacted by letter in the hope of supplying a few answers.
This article, then, will report on the information received from the industry
on the use of and attitude toward cognovits; will quickly review the state of
the existing law, both case and statutory; and finally will speculate on the
"proper" application of due process and full faith and credit to cognovits.
Tim INsTIuTIONAL APPROACHi
Lawyers and executives in the finance industry were questioned, by letter,
on the use of cognovit clauses, the attitude of industry decision makers toward
their propriety, and the techniques of industry attorneys in handling the con-
flict problems. Although the lawyers and executives contacted were in no sense
a statistical sample, comments were elicited from knowledgeable counsel and
executives of a broad range of large and medium-sized sales-finance com-
panies, small loan companies, banks and trade associations. 23 Names were
22 See the section on Traditional Wisdom infra.
23 Letters were received from the following: Mr. Clifford R. Schuman, Assistant to the
General Counsel, Universal C.I.T. Credit Corporation, New York, N.Y.; Mr. Warren Van
Norman, Corporate Counsel and Public Relations Director, Securities Acceptance Cor-
poration, Omaha, Nebraska; Mr. R. K. Doughty, Legal Analysis Department, General
Motors Acceptance Corporation, New York, N.Y.; Mr. W. F. Robinson, General Counsel,
Pacific Finance Corporation, Los Angeles, California; Mr. L. J. Wynne, Counsel, General
Acceptance Corporation, Allentown, Pennsylvania; Mr. George W. Omacht, Vice President
and Senior Counsel, and Mr. Paul R. Moo, General Counsel, Associates Investment Com-
pany, South Bend, Indiana; Mr. Floyd E. Britton and Mr. Roger S. Barrett, Hubachek &
Kelly, Attorneys at Law, Chicago, Illinois (Attorneys for Household Finance Corporation);
Mr. John E. Peterson, Attorney, Vice President and Secretary, Dial Finance Company, Des
Moines, Iowa; Mr. Max M. Ainsworth, Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer,
Industrial Finance and Thrift Corporation, New Orleans, Louisiana; Mr. L. J. Holroyd,
Assistant General Counsel, State Loan and Finance Corporation, Washington, D.C.; Mr.
J. Leonard Smith, Jr., of Reed, Smith, Shaw & McClay, Attorneys at Law, Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania (Counsel for Mellon National Bank and Trust Company, Pittsburgh, Penn-
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obtained by a use of a non-scientific, but effective source. Outside information
gave the names of W. F. Robinson, General Counsel of Pacific Finance Cor-
poration, and of John D. Masterson, Secretary of the American Finance Con-
ference, Inc. They were asked to, and did, supply other names. A sort of chain
letter process resulted, showing extensive duplication, until time forced a halt.
Those answering 24 displayed a wide knowledge not only of their particular
clients' practices, but of their segment of the industry as a whole. The field was
reasonably well covered. Information concerning the use of cognovits and
court practices in Chicago, Illinois, were compiled for the author by Richard
R. Elledge, a student at the University of Chicago Law School.25
The various replies indicate a complex combination both of inclusion, in
standard company forms, of cognovit clauses and of their use when included.
Apparently the determinants of the variables include geography (law, myth,
and custom of a particular state); the felt or unfelt pressures of competition;
the desired corporate image (public relations and industrial relations); the
concept as to the role of the legal counsel held by the legal staff; and the avail-
ability of other security devices (law and type of loans).
But few generalizations are possible. Example must suffice. For those com-
panies that include and use cognovits, Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Ohio are by
far the most popular states and produce the overwhelming bulk of cognovit
judgments taken in the United States.26 All three states currently provide for
cognovits 27 and the small loan or retail sales acts do not prohibit their use.28
sylvania); S. Knox Hunter, Assistant Secretary, Pittsburgh National Bank, Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania; Mr. Stanley L. Lind, Attorney at Law, Kansas City, Kansas (Counsel and
Executive Secretary of the Kansas Consumer Finance Association); Paul L. Selby, Executive
Vice President, National Consumer Finance Association, Washington, D.C.; and Mr. John
D. Masterson, Secretary, American Finance Conference, Inc., Chicago, Illinois. These letters
are on file at the University of Kansas Law School Library. Dr. N. R. Neifeld, Economist,
formerly with Beneficial Management Corporation, was kind enough to give me some general
information concerning the finance industry and to suggest various sources of information.
24 Not everyone did. The following failed to answer the letter: Thomas McCausland and
J. Francis Ireton of Muecke, Mules & Ireton representing Commercial Credit Corp.;
Joseph Louis of Family Finance Corp.; Colonel Edger Higgins of Beneficial Finance Corp.;
R. Bruce Snow of American Investment; and Frank Csar of General Finance Corp.
25 His report is also on file at the University of Kansas Law School Library. Previously
published material gave additional information on industry practices. Pennsylvania practice
in 1954 is reported in Note, Confessions of Judgments, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 524 (1954). For
earlier practices in Ohio, see Hunter, The Warrant of Attorney to Confess Judgment, 8 OHIo
ST. L.J. 1 (1941).
26 All informants commenting agree. None deny. For the same conclusion, see Note,
102 U. PA. L. Rv. 524 (1954). In most of the cases where enforcement is sought in F2, the
original judgment was taken in Illinois, Pennsylvania or Ohio.
27 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 50 (4) (1959); OHIo REV. CoDE ANN. § 2323.13 (Baldwin
1960); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 739 (Purdon 1960).
28 The retail sales finance act of Illinois specifically allows their use in a retail sales finance
contract, but it may be enforced only after default. See note 113 infra.
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Time did not permit exploration on why these three states should be unique.
An attempt was made in Illinois during the Spring of 1961 to tighten up on
credit practices and to prohibit cognovits. 29 The general prohibition appar-
ently failed although the legislature did restrict cognovit judgment as a basis
for garnishment.30 Yet Ohio and Pennsylvania seem content.31 Undoubtedly
early history and long standing custom, lobbying skill and the folklore as to
the proper relationship of debtor and creditor 32 all play a role.
To what extent these companies included a cognovit clause generally, or in
specific types of loans, in other states remains vague. Several informants said
that as to particular types or on all loans their company included cognovits:
"[I]n all instances where they are legal."3 3 However, the only other states spe-
cifically mentioned by informants were Louisiana, where two companies in-
clude cognovits for local procedural reasons, even though judgments are not
taken under them,34 and Wisconsin, where one company mentioned using
cogovits in loans under the discount loan law, but not under the small loan
29 George Omacht inclosed a copy of the Chicago Sun-Times, April 12, 1961,p. 16, col. 1,
reporting that such a bill passed the Illinois House.
301Te Illinois legislative session ended on June 30, 1961, with no general prohibition
being reported. 3 CCH, CONDIT. CrAT. MORT. Rm'. 28,903 (1961). The legislature did add
section 82 to the Garnishment Act (ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 62, § 82 (1961)), to provide, rather
ambiguously, that before "seeking a deduction order" the confession judgment must be
"confirmed" after a trial de novo. The statute provides that the plaintiff must make an
attempt, at least, to give defendant a form of notice prior to the trial de noio. Ill. Laws 1961,
p. -, H.B. No. 462, § 12 (June 19, 1961).
31 Floyd t. Britton of Hubachek & Kelly, counsel for Household Finance, states :"One
hearg of no complaints in that state [Pennsylvania] about abuses of confessions. In Ohio ...
I recall no public outcry as is presently the case in Illinois."
32 Floyd Britton and Roger Barrett of Hubachek & Kelly for Household Finance Corp.
suggest that cognovits can only be evaluated in terms of other creditor remedies. Yet the
available remedies vary among the three states and are not significantly different from many
of the other 47 states that put more of a limitation on cognovits.
33 L. J. Wynne for General Acceptance Corporation. Clifford R. Schuman for Universal
C.I.T. reports, as.to their consumer loan operation, that: "'[A] confession of judgment is
included ... wherever the general law of the particular jurisdiction permits it and the small
loans law, if any, in that jurisdiction does not prohibit it." W. Omacht for Associates Invest-
ment Company says: "[I1n states with a confession ofjudgment statute the clause is a part of
the boiler-plate of every obligation."
34 Clifford Schuman reporting for Universal C.I.T. states that: "In Louisiana, the confes-
sion is rarely, if ever, used. It is included to convince a local judge that executory process
under Louisiana law should be permitted." Max Ainsworth reporting for Industrial Finance
and Thrift Corporation, doing business in eleven southern states, wrote that only in Louisi-
ana does his company still retain the cognovit clause. He said: "The only reason the cognovit
clause has been left in the Louisiana chattel mortgage form is for the purpose of proceeding
'via executiva' if it were to become necessary, and frankly, I cannot recall an occasion where
it was necessary to use this proceeding in the last few years.... It is effective only where a
loan is made above the small loan limit of $300.. . ." See note 92 infra for Louisiana law.
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act. 35 One informant mentioned that cognovits were used in Colorado, al-
though his company did not use them.36
Many companies, even though doing business in the popular states, Illi-
nois, Pennsylvania, and Ohio, refuse to include a cognovit at all. The industry
is split, and from the tone of the letters, bitterly so. Apart from the proffered
explanations, the facts show that those companies primarily engaged in sales
financing, as distinct from small loans, tend to omit them.37 General Motors
Acceptance Corporation and apparently Pacific Finance Corporation both
deny inclusion.38 Securities Acceptance Corporation denies inclusion, but Il-
linois, Pennsylvania, and Ohio are not among the fifteen states in which it does
business. 39 Universal C.I.T., although doing business in all fifty states, in-
cludes a cognovit clause in its form lien documents in only four states-
Illinois, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Louisiana. 40 But the cognovit clause is used
only when necessary and is not favored.41
The reports from the small loan companies show greater inclusion, but
35 Roger S. Barrett reporting for Household Finance Corporation.
36 Warren Van Norman reporting for Securities Acceptance Corp. L. 3. Wynne reporting
for General Acceptance mentioned Idaho, Maryland and Virginia, but implied that cogno-
vits were not used by his company since they were prohibited by the small loan law (all three
states) or by the sales finance act (Maryland).
37 Information was specifically requested as to the types of loans made. The answers show
that traditionally there was a major division in the finance industry-those financing retail
sales, primarily automobiles, who are now members of the American Finance Conference,
Inc., and those engaged in direct loans of small amounts, normally under small loan laws,
who are now members of the National Consumer Finance Association. Today, however,
those selling money have felt the need, along with the rest of American industry, to diversify
their product. Most of the informants report that while primarily engaged in either sales
financing or small loans, they now engage in or are entering the other field, although for
some it is still in an experimental stage. Many of these companies also have a qommercial
division which apparently competes with commercial banks on large loans. Floor plan
financing is also a quite typical activity.
39 R. K. Doughty for GMAC reports: "General Motors Acceptance Corporation has
never, so far as I can learn, employed cognovit clauses." W. F. Robinson for Pacific Finance
Corporation did not specifically deny inclusion by Pacific Finance but stated: "Even in
those states where confession of judgment clauses are permitted, many companies will not
use them or enforce them, principally because of the possible adverse effect upon public
relations." The whole letter invokes distaste for "practices which are likely to be viewed by
the public as unconscionable or unfair."
39 Warren Van Norman reports: "Securities Acceptance Corporation ... does not use
such a clause in any such instrument and, as near as I have been able to learn, never has."
40 Clifford Schuman reports that judgments are not taken in Louisiana. See note 34
supra.
41 Schuman reports: "[Ylou will appreciate how infrequently we introduce a confession
of judgment in retail installment motor vehicle business. It has never been looked upon as a
desirable method of enforcing liability generally, even apart from state laws which may pro-
hibit it or create procedural difficulties in enforcing it. This policy has been constant and of
long standing here."
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statements questioning, pro and con, the wisdom of cognovits become more
frequent. Again, ignoring motives for the moment, the facts show that General
Acceptance Corporation and Associates Investment Company include cogno-
vits wherever legal. 4 2 Household Finance, doing business in forty-five states,
includes them only in Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Ohio and on discount loans in
Wisconsin.43 Others never or only in a limited manner print cognovits in their
contracts. Although doing business in Illinois and Pennsylvania" and twenty-
one other states, Dial Finance Company never includes them.45 Industrial
Finance and Thrift, doing business in eleven Southern states, ignores them
except for technical reasgns in Louisiana.46 Doing business in Illinois and
Ohio as well as twenty-seven other states, State Loan and Finance Corpora-
tion includes cognovits only in Pennsylvania.4 7 In Kansas, a state where there
are only procedural limitations on the use of cognovits, Stanley Lind, Counsel
and Executive Secretary of the Kansas Consumer Finance Association, ad-
vises that to his knowledge a cognovit clause is not included by any chain or
independent loan company, sales finance company or bank in Kansas.48
But even inclusion in the credit instrument by those companies does not
necessarily imply the use of the clause to take judgment. As mentioned
above,49 the inclusion of the clause in notes in Louisiana is for technical rea-
sons only, not for the taking of judgment. Information was sought as to when
and under what conditions judgments were taken under the clause. Many an-
42 L. J. Wynne for General Acceptance reports: "Our company uses notes containing a
cognovit clause in all instances where they are legal." However, he specifically talks in terms
of Illinois, Pennsylvania and Ohio. Paul Moo reporting for Associates Investment Company
states: "[Glenerally ... our company uses judgment notes or contracts containing cognovit
clauses wherever legally permissible." George Omacht of the same company speaking gen-
erally said: "[Wn states with a confession of judgment statute, the clause is a part of the
boiler-plate of every obligation. It is in all obligations taken by banks and other lending in-
stitutions whether the obligation is for one hundred dollars or a million."
in contrast to Universal C.I.T.'s limited use of cognovits in sales financing, Clifford
Schuman reports that: "an consumer loans, confession of judgment is included in the per-
tinent obligation wherever the general law of the particular jurisdiction permits it and the
small loans law, if any... does not prohibit it."
43 Letter from Floyd Britton of Hubachek & Kelly.
44 But not Ohio.
45 Letter from John Peterson.
46 Letter from Max Ainsworth. He said that cognovits were taken out of loan instru-
ments, except in Louisiana, ten years ago. See note 34 supra for a discussion of the Louisiana
problem.
47 Letter from L. J. Holroyd.
48 
"To my knowledge, this type of clause is not used by any finance company in Kansas.
I would be greatly surprised to learn that they are used by any of the banks in Kansas:'
Letter from Stanley Lind.
49 See note 34 sipra.
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swers were vague, but most implied that on small consumer loans, judgments
were rare. Actually judgments were more frequent on the larger commercial
loans.5O
However, Elledge5' reports that in the Municipal Court of Chicago, which
handles the majority of confession cases and which hears more cases per year
than all other courts in the State of Illinois combined, there were 45,402 suits
on confession of judgment out of a total of 193,191 suits filed in 1960. There
are no statistics available for the Circuit Court of Cook County or the Su-
perior Court of Cook County, but estimates give each ten to fifteen confession
judgments a week or a minimum total of 1,000 more cases a year.S2 Surely a
large volume of cognovit judgments!
What reasons are offered by these attorneys for the inclusion or non-inclu-
sion of cognovit clauses? The most obvious factor is the prohibiting or proce-
dural limitation statutes of the several states. Most informants commented on
the many prohibitions found in state laws as an overall restricting factor on
their use. These restrictions also result in a decision to refrain from using
SO L. J. Wynne replied for General Acceptance Corporation: "On an overall basis, rela-
tively fewjudgments are ever entered except on the commercial loans. In Pennsylvania judg-
ment would be entered on a personal loan after default (although this is not a prerequisite in
Pennsylvania) but only if the particular borrower is known to have personal or real property
upon which a lien could be created.... On the Sales Finance accounts in Pennsylvania we
look first to the security and only enterjudgment under the same circumstances as... per-
sonal loans. On commercial loans we do enter judgment immediately for the purpose of
creating a lien on real property.... [Outside Pennsylvania] we confess judgment upon de-
fault at any time it appears practical to do so and, of course, it is legal to do so."
Paul Moo reporting for Associates Investment Company said: "You next inquire whether
judgments are entered under such contracts and notes and, of course, the answer is definitely
yes."9
Clifford Schuman reporting for Universal C.I.T. replied: "ITihe confession of judgment
is utilized wherever the conditions in the particular case indicate it is advisable or neces-
sary ... [N]o specific rule of thumb is possible. From the above, you will appreciate how
infrequently we introduce a confession of judgment in retail installment motor vehicle busi-
ness."
L. J. Holroyd replied for State Loan and Finance 'orp.: "We use Cognovit clauses in
notes only in ... Pennsylvania.... From time to time with delinquent accounts judgments
are entered. This is done at the discretion of the operating people, if they think it will assist
them in collection."
Apparently in Pennsylvania a larger percentage ofjudgments are eatered since judgments
are taken before default to be used in lieu of a mortgage. For the peculiarities of Pennsyl-
vania practice, see Note, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 524 (1954). Both J. Leonard Smith, Jr., of
Reed, Smith, Shaw & McClay, reporting for The Mellon National Bank of Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania and S. Knox Hunter reporting for the Pittsburgh National Bank state that
judgments are taken on cognovits extensively and particularly on real estate loans.
51 See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
52 In Hunter, The Warrant of Attorney to Confess Judgment, 8 Omo ST. L. J. 1 (1941), the
author argued that there should be greater use of cognovits in Ohio and other states. How-
ever, he reports that in the Franklin County Common Pleas Court: "In a period of approxi-
mately eighteen months from August 1937 to February 1939 a total of 3510 civil cases were
filed. 500 cases or 14.2 per cent ... were those involving cognovit notes." Id. at 14.
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cognovits in states where they are legal. Apparently the companies desire to
keep their practice uniform.53
The major split seems to revolve around the view held by the company as to
the public reaction to cognovits and the inherent "fairness" of a judgment pro-
cedure that does not provide for notice. Typical negative comments include:
"My feeling is that the small advantage of a cognovit clause is overwhelmingly
outweighed by the possible ill will that would be created toward the cus-
tomers, opposing lawyers, judges, and the public in general." 54 "Even in those
states where confession of judgment clauses are permitted, many companies
will not use them or enforce them, principally because of the possible adverse
effect upon public relations."S5 "Top management... considers that a debtor
... should not by a device such as this be denied his 'day in court.' Quite
obviously there could be an adverse reaction by the courts and the public at
large against the finance industry if widespread use were made of the 'cognovit
clause' device."s6 Others in the field also express a negative attitude,5 7 and
even users of the clause admit that inequities may exist.5 8 The attitude of the
trade associations is mostly unknown.5 9 However, Paul L. Selby, Executive
Vice-President of the National Consumer Finance Association said: "I feel
very strongly that the cognovit clause should not be used in the note contracts
for consumer installments cash loans made under the Small Loan Act."
53 John Peterson reporting for Dial Finance Company said: "We do not use... due to
the fact that most of the small loan laws under which we operate have a prohibition against
such notes." Dial operates in Illinois and Pennsylvania. Warren Van Norman reporting for
Securities Acceptance Corporation said that there were two reasons for not using cognovits.
One was public relations discussed infra. The other was that Nebraska prohibited cognovits
when the company was first organized. Although it now does business in fifteen ststes, "most
of these expressly prohibit such clauses. .. "
54 Max Ainsworth for Industrial Finance and Thrift.
55 W. F. Robinson for Pacific Finance Corporation.
56 Warren Van Norman for Securities Acceptance Corporation.
51The concept that, apart from "public relations," the use of such a clause is inherently
unfair is well expressed by Stanley Lind for the Kansas Consumer Finance Association.
Having drawn most of the forms for use by Kansas companies, he comments that such
clauses could be used in Kansas, but adds: "[Mrhe reason I do not use this clause in notes,
mortgages and contracts... is that I do not consider such a clause fair to the borrower nor
consistent with the concept of notice as embodied in our process statutes."
Others mentioning adverse public relations include R. K. Doughty of General Motors
Acceptance Corporation and Clifford Schuman of Universal C.I.T.
58 George W. Omacht for Associates Investment Co. said: "Some hardship cases appear
under the [cognovit] system, but I think an equal number of hardship cases appear under the
summons and judgment after hearing plan." Floyd E. Britton of Hubachek & Kelly for
HFC said: "There is one class of claims, however, where confessions may lean too heavily in
favor of creditors. In actions to recover what is generally described as deficiencies ... the
amount actually due often, if not generally, depends on ex parte action by the creditor.
Confessions in such actions are subject to abuses."
59 John Masterson, Secretary, American Finance Conference did not express an opinion.
Other associations were not contacted.
COGNOVIT JUDGMENTS
Most users of cognovits are quick and forceful in their defense. They claim
little or no adverse public reaction to such clauses, or at least that it is not a
problem. Typical comments include: "[Tihere has been no public reluctance
to execute judgment obligations.... Debtors in states permitting judgment
notes are apparently accustomed to giving that type of obligation ... [W e
use them wherever legally permissible, have had no adverse public reaction
to their use and feel that they are a legitimate and proper collection device."60
"We consider no other factors in determining whether a cognovit clause is in-
cluded in the note beyond its legality.... On personal loans and sales finance
accounts, we have no recollection whatsoever of any borrower or purchasers
refusing to sign such a note. The good will of the borrower or purchaser has
never been a factor." 6' "[V]ery few borrowers are alarmed by the presence of a
warrent of attorney... Accordingly, the practice seems to be general in
Pennsylvania." 62
One defender pointed out that it is unfair to value the cognovit clause in
isolation. Other creditors' remedies are as important. Floyd Britton of Huba-
check & Kelly for Household Finance Company remarked: "[Legislatures
should] consider the problem as one involving the aggregate of legal collection
remedies prevailing in the particular jurisdiction, the job being to achieve
some kind of balance between the interests--the real interests--of all parties
and the public. It surely is not an easy solution and much depends on custom
and tradition in each jurisdiction."63
Mr. George Omacht for Associates Investment Company argued that the
national policy promoting the sale of consumer goods had to be balanced
against debtor protection. If good collection procedures are available, loans
will be made to weaker borrowers. He remarked: "I do not know the answer
to this problem of public policy. Finance companies and consumer lenders
can fit their credit policy to either policy the state chooses."
Several defenders counter-attack the basic claim of the non-users that lack
of notice prior to suit is inherently unfair. The argument is twofold. (1) "A
confession clause permits the lender to obtain quickly and cheaply a lien
against the debtor, where generally the only real defense is unwillingness or
60 Paul Moo for Associates Investment Company.
61 L. J. Wynne for General Acceptance Corporation.
62 J. Leonard Smith, Jr., of Reed, Smith, Shaw & McClay for Mellon National Bank.
L. J. Holroyd for State Loan and Finance Corp. added: "[It] is the general practice in the
trade, so there is no adverse public or customer relations effect."
63 Roger Barrett of Hubachek & Kelly echoed these statements. Earlier Mr. Britton gives
an example of the need of looking at total remedies. He said: 'Iin Illinois where a power of
attorney ... is common, a garnishment procedure may proceed immediately on entry of
judgment. In Wisconsin where... under the small loan law, judgments by confession are
prohibited, garnishment procedure may proceed prior to judgment. It is doubtful therefore
whether there is any real or practical difference.... The guy's wages have been garnished
without prior notice in either case!"
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inability to pay." 64 (2) "m71he judges freely grant motions to vacate judgments
by confession.... The judges seem to rely on the theory that the defendant is
entitled to his day in court, and if the motion alleges any defense, regardless of
how weak it may be... he generally grants the motion and sets the case for
triaL"65
To what extent consumer loan or installment buyer defendants, when in-
formed of a judgment through execution or garnishment, employ a lawyer to
"open the judgment" is unknown. Mr. Elledge66 reports: "There are no sta-
tistics on the frequency of motions to open or vacate judgments, but Judge
McNamara67 and his bailiff estimate that ten to twelve motions are enter-
tained in an average week."68 How many improper judgments are taken is
unknown. However, Mr. Elledge included in his findings five reports of John
King, Special Commissioner of the Municipal Court,69 covering the period of
July 25, 1960, to December 15, 1960. A typical early report shows that from
August 5 to August 18 there were 1,774 judgments filed. Commissioner King
and his staff rejected 377 for a wide variety of errors including "No confession
clause in the note"; "Statute of limitation"; and "Confession against a single
person on a joint note." 70
The system seems to invite abuse. According to Elledge, printed forms are
used. A clerk in the judge's office supposedly checks the papers. He then ini-
tials the statement of claim, rubber stamps "his" judge's signature, and enters
the name of the case and the amount of the judgment in the judgment book.
The pages of this book are signed by the judge daily. With better than 45,000
64 S. Knox Hunter for Pittsburgh National Bank.
65 George Omacht for Associates Investment Co. Both these arguments were also made
by Floyd Britton of Hubachek & Kelly for Household Finance Company and J. Leonard
Smith, Jr., of Reed, Smith, Shaw & McClay for Mellon National Bank. See note 126 infra,
for cases discussing the right to open a confession judgment.
66 See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
67 Judge of the Municipal Court of Chicago.
68 Elledge earlier reported an average of 875 confession judgments per week in the Mu-
nicipal Court. According to Commissioner King, appointed by Mayor Daley to investigate
credit practices in the Municipal Court, "No motion to vacate with any merit at all has ever
been turned down."
69 King was appointed by Mayor Daley of Chicago, iuiois, to investigate credit prac-
tices in Chicago Municipal Court. The reports were sent to the Chief Justice of the Municipal
Court.
70 Other reasons listed were that: 2. The note had not matured; 3. Variance between
named defendant and signature on note; 4. Excessive attorney's fees; 5. Affidavits not
signed; 6. Rubber stamps used for signature; 7. Excessive interest; 8. Principal not properly
named; 9. Affidavits not properly made; 10. Notes with no provision for attorney fees. Later
reports show fewer rejects. Undoubtedly, creditors realized Commissioner King was check-
ing.
Many comments on individual cases appear in these reports and show a wide variety of
abuses. There is some evidence that the rejects tend to center in certain companies. Happily
none of the companies who participated in the author's survey appear on Commissioner
King's list.
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judgments a year, it is not surprising that Commissioner King found many
errors.71
One defense raised by two or three users centered on the problem of court
congestion in our large cities. Confession judgments now avoid the delay.
Notice and a hearing would greatly increase the congestion, they argue, and
would necessitate an increased number of judges and process servers. This
may be a very real, practical problem to any plaintiff. But delay, or the ex-
pense in increasing the number of judges, is hardly adequate reason to con-
tinue a practice if it is found to be unfair and unjust.
Problems of unfairness and public relations are not the only reason for
non-use. The economics of the trade play an important role. As pointed out
by R. K. Doughty,72 finance companies doing business on a recourse basis
with dealers are not faced with the same losses as are banks and small loan
companies. This may partially explain why finance companies tend to make
less use of the cognovit clause.73 Certainly many of the users expressed the
economic need for such a clause. The clause, they argued, provided a quick
and efficient method of obtaining judgment after default.74
A few other suggestions as to factors determining use or non-use are worth
quoting. L. J. Holroyd75 mentions the importance of competition. His com-
pany uses the cognovits only in Pennsylvania. He said: "I would say it is the
practice of the trade which determines whether or not we would use a cognovit
clause.... [W]e, as a company, would not use it unless the trade generally
followed this practice." 76 The pressure of competition may make it difficult
for a company to resist. R. K. Doughty reporting for General Motors Ac-
ceptance Corporation, a company that does not use cognovits, remarked in
passing: "One further point may be of some assistance.... [O]ur Pennsyl-
vania managers have quite often raised the question as to why we can't follow
banking and other finance company practices by incorporating cognovit
clauses in our contracts." 77
71 Professor Hunter does not purport to examine abuses. Hunter, The Warrant of At-
torney to Confess Judgment, 8 OHIO ST. LJ. 1, 15 (1941). However, he found that in only 26
out of 500 cases did the defendant attempt to have it set aside and in only two cases was a
judgment ultimately entered for the defendant. (In five cases the porties settled.) The fact
that courts will freely and almost automatically open up a confession judgment hardly shows
that the system works fairly. Rather it indicates that trial court judges feel that the system is
inherently subject to abuse.
72 Reporting for General Motors Acceptance Corporation.
73 See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
74 L. J. Wynne for General Acceptance Corporation points out that when public relations
is not a factor, the legal staff encourages increased use.
75 Reporting for State Loan and Finance Corporation.
76 Although State Loan does business in Illinois and Ohio, it does not use the cognovit
clause in those states.
77 Mr. Doughty gives no answer in the letter, but presumably the general policy against
use is strong enough to overcome the managers' objections.
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Although many users suggest the efficacy of the clause, Max Ainsworth of
Industrial Finance and Thrift pointed out that ten years ago he removed the
cognovit clause from its credit instruments because they were not needed. He
added: "I doubt if any office of our entire system or the local attorney for each
office has had an occasion whereby a cognovit clause would have been of any
great assistance. At least, I have had no complaints."
One final point is of significance. Since the "adhesive" nature of a contract
is an important determinant in conflict of laws,78 the informants were asked
about objections from borrowers to the inclusion of a cognovit clause. Users
were unanimous in replying that the small borrower never objected. Several
mentioned that the borrower was conditioned to cognovits. It was custom-
ary. 79 However, many raised the point that they made large commercial loans
which included a cognovit clause. "Confession of judgment clauses are not
limited, in the least, to consumer obligations."8 0 Although S. Knox Hunter
for the Pittsburgh National Bank implied that "out of state borrowers" and
"'corporate borrowers" may object,81 L. J. Wynne for General Acceptance
Corporation and Paul Moo for Associates Investment Company both state
that as a matter of practice they insist that a cognovit clause be included in the
large loan, despite the borrower's objection. As a practical matter, it might
seem that all contracts between institutional lenders and borrowers are to be
classified as adhesion contracts.
Probably the most surprising result of the inquiry was the lack of interest
in the conflict of laws aspects of cognovits. Several specific questions were
asked and while other questions were answered in detail, conflict questions
were normally ignored. The few responses indicated that either the companies
do not engage in practices that raise conflict issues or else the legal problems
are not acute. For instance, one attorney remarked: "[Y]ou indicate in your
first paragraph that your article will discuss mainly judgments by confession.
Assuming validity in the state where the contract was made and in the state of
the forum, FF&C comes into play and some interesting legal and constitu-
tional questions can arise. I had several a number of years ago, but at the
moment do not recall the details."82
Another attorney remarked that two questions had arisen, but the legal
staff had not taken the time to resolve them. (1) Contract made in Florida,
7 8 Ehrenzweig, Adhesion Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 53 COLUM. L. Rav. 1072 (1952);
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), CoNFLIcr oF LAws § 332a, comment e, at 20 (Tent. Draft No. 6,
1960). For a full discussion of the nature and importance of "adhesion" contracts, see note
166 infra and accompanying text.
79 See note 60 supra and accompanying text.
80 George Omacht for Associates Investment Company. He added: "Such loans are
-,sually in chunks of a million to five million."
81 He reports that some feel that their credit is such that they should not be required to
xecute that type of note.
82 Lloyd Britton of Hubachek & Kelly for Household Finance Corporation.
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which prohibits the clause, and later the defendant moved to Pennsylvania.
May judgment be taken in Pennsylvania? (2) Contract signed in Florida by a
resident there and mailed to Pennsylvania where it was accepted and the
money disbursed. Judgment entered in Pennsylvania. May the judgment be
enforced in Florida?83
The informants reported on three specific bits of information. L. J. Holroyd
for State Loan and Finance Company remarked: "Incidentally, from a practi-
cal standpoint, we have had little difficulty proving our judgments in foreign
jurisdictions based on a confessed judgment in Pennsylvania." Floyd Britton
of Hubachek & Kelly for Household Finance Corporation commented that:
"Pennsylvania creditors sometimes confess judgment in Ohio where the de-
fendant's employer may be served with garnishee process." He labels the tak-
ing of a judgment in a jurisdiction other than where the defendant resides or
the cause of action arose, a "sharp practice." Paul Moo for Associates Invest-
ment Company, whose home office is in Indiana, explains that since Indiana
prohibits cognovits, 8 4 the company has the obligation payable at one of their
offices in Illinois, Ohio or Pennsylvania.85
The basic split in the industry on the justifications for use-public policy,
fairness, need, competition, and custom, indicates, at best, a limited argument
in favor of cognovit clauses in any type of credit instrument. The letters show
that the industry itself would not object too strenuously to a complete aboli-
tion.8 6 As one extensive user who strongly defended the practice said: "Fi-
nance companies and consumer lenders can fit this credit policy to either pol-
icy the state chooses." 8 7 Although the economic policy of the country favors
credit buying, judgments without notice and opportunity to defend are not
vital to that policy.
Information on the practices of the industry in using cognovits to take judg-
ment in a state other than that of the domicile of the borrower is singularly
lacking. While the letters indicate that the practice is not unknown and that it
raises certain legal problems, it is not a current and bothersome one to indus-
try lawyers. Nevertheless, the cases discussed in the next section indicate that
the industry does try to enforce these judgments in a second state.
The industry is split, but generally negative. But how have American legis-
latures and courts traditionally responded to consent as found in a cognovit
clause?
83 L. J. Wynne for General Acceptance.
84 IN. ANN. STAT. § 2-2906 (1946).
85 The letter is not clear as to whether this is true on all obligations or only those signed
by Illinois, Ohio or Pennsylvania citizens.
86 Perhaps the industry would object on Pennsylvania real estate loans. There the cogno-
vit is not a collection device, but a security interest substituting a judgment lien for a mort-
gage by taking judgment the day the money is loaned. See Note, 102 U. PA. L. Rav. 524
(1954). The validity of this policy must be left to experts on mortgages and securities.
97 George Omacht for Associates Investment Company.
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TI TRADITIONAL WISDOM
State legislatures have reacted to the problem of cognovit clauses in a wide
variety of ways. Affirmatively there are only seven states having general
statutes which specifically allow their use.88 The legislatures of two states,
Indiana, and New Mexico,8 9 not only declare them void, but make the execu-
tion of such a clause a misdemeanor. Thirteen other states merely declared
such clauses void.90
In the other twenty-seven states the status of cognovits is not as clear. Four
states have no pertinent statutes.91 The remaining twenty-three place various
procedural limitations on the confession of judgments generally, 92 which
88 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 2306 (1953); HAWAI REV. LAwS § 229--3 (1955) (on notes
not exceeding $1000.00); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 50(4) (1959); Onto REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2323.13 (Baldwin 1960); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 739 (Supp. 1960); VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 8-355, 8-356 (1950); Wis. STAT. § 270.69 (1957).
A typical statute reads: "It shall be the duty of the prothonotary of any court of record,
within this commonwealth, on the application of any person, being the original holder (or
assignee of such holder) of a note... in which judgment is confessed, or containing a war-
rant for an attorney at law, or other person, to confess judgment, to enter judgment against
the person or persons who executed the same ... ." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 739 (Supp.
1960).
However, by court decision the use of a cognovit may be rendered diflficult. See General
Contract Purchase Corp. v. Max Keil Real Estate Co., 35 Del. (5 Harr.) 531, 170 Ati. 797
(Super. Ct. 1933) (limiting cognovits to notes under seal). Note also that several of these
states prohibit confession clauses in particular types of loans. See note 112 infra and accom-
panying text.
S9 IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-2906 (1946); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-9-16, 21-9-18 (1953).
9o ALA. CODE tit. 20, § 16 (1958); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 4 -143 (1956); FLA. STAT.
§ 55.05 (1959); GA. CODE § 110-601 (1933); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 372.140 (1955); MAss.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 13a (1959); MicH. COMP. LAWS § 622.3 (1948); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 1545 (1942); MONT. REv. CODE ANN. § 13-811 (1947): N.J. REv. STAr. §2A:
16-9 (1951); TENN. CODE ANN. § 25-201 (1955); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2224
(1959); VT. STAT. tit. 9, § 1480 (1947).
There is little uniformity in the language of the prohibiting statutes. The Massachusetts
statute gives the basic approach. "Any stipulation in a... promissory note ... whereby a
party thereto agrees to confess judgment in any action which may be brought thereon or
authorizes or agrees to authorize another person to confess judgment as aforesaid shall be
void.. . ." MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 13a (1959).
91 Colorado, Maine, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island.
92 ALASKA CoMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 55-9-31 to -34 (1949); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-301 to
-303 (1948); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 1132-35; CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. §§ 52-193
to -195 (1958); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 10-901 to -904 (1949); IOWA CODE §§ 676.1-.4
(1958); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-3111 to -3116 (1949); LA. CONSr. art. 7, § 44 (1921);
MD. ANN. CODE, GEN. R. PR. AND P. 645 (1957), MINN. STAT. §§ 548.22-.23 (1957); Mo.
REv. STAT. §§ 511.070-.100 (1949); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-1309 to -1312 (1956); NEV.
REv. STAT. §§ 17.090-.110 (1957); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT §§ 540-545; N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 1-247 to -249 (1944); N.D. R. Civ. P. 68(c) (1960); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 689-695
(1960); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 26.010-.030 (1959); S.C. CODE §§ 10-1535 to -1538 (1952);
S.D. CODE §§ 37-0301 to -0303 (1939); UTAH R. Cxv. P. 58A(e) (1953); WASH. REy. CODE
§§ 4.60.010-.070 (1956); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-309 to -313 (1959).
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may93 or may not94 specifically provide for obtaining in personam jurisdiction
through the use of a cognovit clause.
In those states with the latter type of statute and in the four states9 s lacking
any statutory procedure for confessions, the courts are not in agreement as to
the effect of the absence of a cognovit provision. The basic problem facing
those courts is whether, without an authorizing statute, a cognovit clause can
be used to obtain jurisdiction over the defendant apart from any restrictions
on the procedure for confessing thejudgment.9 6 One view is that the lack of an
authorizing statute is not fatal to obtaining jurisdiction through a cognovit
clause. "Consent" and authorizing an attorney to make that consent for the
defendant were used at common law to obtain jurisdiction.97 Therefore, courts
could argue that they need no statute authorizing this method of obtaining
jurisdiction. Professor Leflar takes this view.98 Decisions exist where the court
apparently assumes this to be true,9 9 even though it may require the general
93 There is some uniformity. For various types see, e.g., MANN. STAT. §§ 548.22-.23
(1957); MD. ANN. CODE, Gn. R. PR. AND P. 645 (1957); OxiA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 689-95
(1960).
94 See e.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 1132-1135, as amended, CAL. CIV. PRMc. CODE
§§ 1134-1135 (Supp. 1960); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-22-3 (1953) allows confession of judg-
ments. UTAH R. Civ. P. 58A(e) contains the limitations. Typically these statutes require
the defendant to file an affidavit that the debt is due and owing after the suit is filed. "Before
a judgment by confession shall be entered a statement in writing must be made and signed
by the defendant and verified by his oath to the... effect.., that the sum confessed
therefor is justly due or to become due .... " S.C. CODE § 10-1536 (1952).
95 See note 91 supra.
96 Today a cognovit actually purports to do two things: (1) authorize the court to assume
in personam jurisdiction over the defendant and (2) authorize the court to render judgment
on the merits for the amount confessed. See General Contract Purchase Corp. v. Max Keil
Real Estate Co., 35 Del. (5 Harr.) 531, 170 At. 797 (Super. Ct. 1933), for a discussion of
early common law practice.
97 For an extensive discussion ofcognovits at common law, see First Nat'1 Bank v. White,
220 Mo. 717, 120 S.W. 36 (1909). But see General Contract Purchase Corp. v. Max Keil
Real Estate Co., supra note 96, denying common law authority. Early history is also dis-
cussed in Note, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 524 (1954).
98 LEFLAR § 29.
99 In Houpt v. Bohl, 71 Ark. 330, 75 S.W. 470 (1903), the court equates a cognovit with
an appearance by the defendant and finds jurisdiction without any discussion of the prob-
lem. The court says that this is a judgment by consent and not a judgment by confession
under the statute. The statute, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 29-301 to -303 (1948). appears to contain
no restriction. It merely provides that any person may confess. In Hutchinson v. Palmer, 147
Ala. 517, 40 So. 339 (1906), the Alabama court found, without aid of statute, that a cog-
novit clause is as binding as service of process. See Monarch Refrigerating Co. v. Faulk, 228
Ala. 554, 155 So. 74 (1934), where the court pointed out that the Alabama statue prohibiting
cognovits was enacted as a result of the Hutchinson case.
Of the four states having no general legislation, Colorado generally allows cognovits.
Warren Van Norman for Securities Acceptance Corp. advises that cognovits are allowed in
Colorado. See note 36 supra and accompanying text. Under COLo. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(5) (1953),
proof of service may be shown by waiver or written admission. No extensive search was
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confession statute to be strictly followed.100 Judge Goodrich disagrees. In dis-
cussing judgment notes he says: "Whether a judgment may be entered in this
way is, in the first instance, a matter of local procedure. The individual's au-
thorization will not change local procedural statutes."101 Some courts deny02
or deny by implication a non-statutory procedure.103
Therefore, cognovits can technically be used in any of these states which
either expressly allow them by statute or allow them through the common law.
But attorneys for the finance industry report0 4 that they are used sparingly
since the various procedural limitations render cognovits ineffective as a
speedy remedy.105
In addition to the general limitation statutes, many state legislatures have
specifically prohibited cognovit clauses in particular transactions. In 1915 the
made, but no case directly allowing cognovits was found. However, Metropolitan State
Bank v. McNutt, 73 Col. 291, 215 Pac. 151 (1923), assumes their validity. In Mountain
States Fixture Co. v. Daskalos, 61 N.M. 491, 303 P.2d 698 (1956), the parties assumed that
the law of Colorado provided for cognovits. The Colorado trial court had entered judgment
on a cognovit clause.
loo See, e.g., Barnes v. Hilton, 118 Cal. App. 2d 108, 257 P.2d 98 (1953).
1 0 1 GooDRIcH § 73, at 198.
102 In Hamilton v. Schoenberger, 47 Iowa 385 (1877), the court held that procedural
statutes providing for judgments by confession are not merely cumulative, but abrogate the
common law method. In General Purchase Corp. v. Max Keil Real Estate Co., 35 Del. 531,
170 Atl. 797 (Super. Ct. 1933) the court denied that at common law a judgment could be
taken on a warrent of attorney without the plaintiff having first instituted an action. The
court concluded that the statutory method, which required the note to be under seal, alone
existed.
103 The Missouri Supreme Court in First Nat'l Bank v. White, 220 Mo. 717, 120 S.W. 36
(1909), took the view that, in the absence of a statute specifically allowing common law cog-
novits, such attempts at obtaining jurisdiction were against public policy and were an at-
tempt to oust the jurisdiction of the court. However the court also suggested that assuming
common law cognovits to be valid, nevertheless, the use of the clause could only be in con-
formity with the procedural limitations contained in the general confession of judgment
statute. With the aid of a statute, Georgia arrived at the same result. Whitley v. Southern
Wholesale Corp., 45 Ga. App. 445, 164 S.E. 903 (1932).
Oklahoma's statute, OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 690 (1960), allows an attorney to confess judg-
ment; so it is of the second type. But in St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. v. Bayne, 170 Okla.
542, 40 P.2d 1104 (1935), the court held that unless the statutory limitations are complied
with, a judgment without service of process on the defendant was void. Apparently a com-
mon law form could not exist.
In Wiley v. Neal, 24 Neb. 141, 37 N.W. 926 (1888), the Nebraska Supreme Court took the
position that since the code required service of process in every case, a judgment entered on a
cognovit clause was void. The plaintiff apparently did not argue the common law right.
104 See note 53 supra and accompanying text.
105 Although Maryland was listed as having procedural limitations, MD. ANN. CoDE,
GEN. R. PR. AND P. 645 (1957), the code specifically provides for cognovits and only re-
"iuires that notice be given the defendant allowing him thirty days to show cause why the
.udgment should not be made final. The attorneys did not mention use in Maryland, but the
Aatute would seem to place only a minor restriction.
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Russell Sage Foundation sponsored a uniform small loan law.106 Basically
aimed at the loan shark's high interest rate, the uniform act contained a sec-
tion prohibiting cognovit clauses. Enacted with variations and later amend-
ments throughout the last forty years, some forty-five states have small loan
acts with twenty-nine states10 7 prohibiting cognovits.
A post World War II phenomenon is the many variants of the special acts
controlling retail installment sales.10s Although there is no "uniform" act,
"legislative common law"109 is at work, and the acts generally follow a basic
pattern. While aimed primarily at restricting unfilled-out contracts and
usurious interest in the guise of finance charges, about one-third of the thirty-
five state statutes contain a section which prohibits the use of cognovit
clauses. 110
As the states adopted one or both of these restrictive acts, the pattern on the
prohibition of cognovits changed. The combinations and permutations are
now wonderful to behold. Of the seven specifically allowing cognovits,ll' three
106 See NEiFELD, TR.ENDs IN CoNswUm FINANCE 1 (1954), for a discussion of the early
history of the uniform small loan law.
107 ALA. CODE tit. 62, § 248 (1958); ARIz. RIv. STAT. ANN. § 6-629 (1956) (licensed money
lender); CAL. FIN. CODE § 24468; CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 36-236 (1958); FLA. STAT.
§ 516.16 (1955); HAwAI REv. LAws § 195-15 (1955); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 26-2013 (1949);
IND. ANN. STAT. § 18-3003 (1950); IOWA CODE § 536.12 (1958); Ky. REv. STAT. § 288.580
(Supp. 1961); LA. REv. STAT. § 6.585 (1950); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 59, § 220 (1954);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 58A, § 19 (1957); MiCH. COMp. LAws § 493.12 (1948); MINN. STAT.
§ 56.12 (1957); NEB. REv. STAT. § 8-430 (1956) (installment loan licensee), § 8-809 (1956)
(banks on loans of S2,000.00 or less); NEe. REv. STAT. § 675.350 (1960); N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 399.28 (1955); N.J. Rv. STAT. § 17:10-15 (1937); N.Y. BANKING LAws § 353
(licensed lender's act); ORE. REv. STAT. § 725.050 (1955); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 19-25-24
(1956); S.C. CODE § 8-794.7 (1952); UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-10-14 (1953); VT. STAT. tit. 8,§ 9007 (1947); VA. CODE ANN. § 6-313 (1950); WAsH. REv. CODE § 31.08.150 (1952);
W. VA. CODE ch. 47, art. 7A, § 4653 (1955); WIs. STAT. § 214.14 (1957). Georgia formally
prohibited confessions in small loans, GA. CODE § 25-315 (1933). In 1955 the Code was
revised. The small loan law appears in GA. CODE ANN. § 25-301 to -324 (1959). The prohi-
bition against cognovits was logically omitted since they are prohibited generally by GA.
CODE § 110-601 (1933).
108 Indiana, Wisconsin, and Michigan enacted statutes prior to World War H. Up to 1955
thirteen states had some sort of statute. However, it has been in the last five years that the
state legislature (some twenty-one states) have gone into this area with a vengeance. Many
acts cover motor vehicles only, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 168.011-.81 (1917)); ORE. REv. STAT.
§ 83.510-990 (Supp. 1957); but in recent years legislatures have included all sales.
109 Horack, The Common Law of Legilation, 23 IowA L. REv. 41 (1937).
110 The following ten states prohibit: CAL. Cxv. CODE § 1804.1c; COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-16-6(1)(b) (1953) (motor vehicle retail sales); CONN. GEN. REv. STAT. § 42-88 (1958);
Ky. REv. STAT. § 190.100(l)(c) (Supp. 1961) (motor vehicle retail sales); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 83, § 130 (1957); MINN. STAT. § 168.71(a)(2) (1957) (motor vehicle retail sales); NJ.
REv. STAT. § 17:16B-6(3) (1937); N.Y. PEns. PRop. LAw § 302(14); N.D. REv. CODE § 51-
1312(13) (Supp. 1959); ORE. REv. STAT. § 83.670(1) (1957) (motor vehicle retail sales).
HI See note 88 supra.
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now prohibit their use by a small loan company," 2 while two specifically allow
their use in a retail sales finance contract, but it may be enforced only after
default."'
Strangely enough, of the sixteen states that generally prohibit cognovits,114
seven state legislatures apparently unthinkingly outlawed cognovits in small
loans," 5 and two states prohibited cognovits in both small loans and in retail
sales contracts." 6
Of the twenty-three states having procedural limitations, 117 eight prohibit
their use by small loan companies,"5 one in retail sales contracts only," 9 and
six in both areas.120
112 HAWAII REV. LAWS § 195-15 (1955); VA. CODE ANN. § 6-313 (1950); Wis. STAT.
§ 214.14 (1957).
113 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 1211/2, § 234(11) (1959). On January 1, 1962, Hawaii's new retail
sales act goes into effect. It follows the Illinois provisions. HAWAII REV. LAWS § 201-11
(1 CCH, CONDIT. SALE-CHAT. MORT. REP. 762 (June 19, 1961.)) The situation in Hawaii
is unique. The general statute, HAWAII REv. LAWS § 229-3 (1955), allows cognovits up to
$1,000.00. The small loan statute prohibits them on $300.00 or under. HAWAII REV. LAWS
§ 195-15 (1955). The new retail sales act, HAWAII REV. LAWS § 201-11 (CCH, CONDIT.
SALE-CHAT. MORT. REP. 762 (June 19, 1961)), allows them!
In these seven states, Ohio, Delaware, and Pennsylvania adopted small loan laws; Ohio
adopted a general retail sales act; and Pennsylvania, Virginia and Wisconsin adopted motor
vehicle retail installments sales acts. All left out any clause prohibiting cognovits.
114 See notes 89 & 90 supra.
115 ALA. CODE tit. 62, § 248 (Supp. 1958); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN., § 6-629 (1956); FLA.
STAT. § 516.16 (1959); IND. ANN. STAT. § 18-3003 (1950); MicH. COMP. LAWS § 493.12
(1948); VT. STAT. tit. 8, § 9007 (1947); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4653 (12) (1955).
116 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:16B-6(a)(3) (1950) (retail sales contracts), § 17:10-15 (1950)
(small loans); KY. REv. STAT. § 288.580 (Supp. 1961)(petty loan companies), § 190.100
(Supp. 1961) (motor vehicle retail installment contracts).
Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Mexico, Tennessee, and Texas have adopted small loan
legislation, but correctly assumed that the general statues would cover and therefore left out
the anti-cognovit clause provision. Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Mississippi, Montana, New Mexico, Tennessee, and Texas currently omitted restrictions in
their general or motor vehicle installment sales contract legislation.
117 See note 92 supra.
118 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 26-2013 (1949); IOWA CODE § 536.12 (1958); LA. REv. Stat.
§ 6.585 (1950); NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-430 (1956), § 8-809 (1956)(prohibits a bank from tak-
ing a confession of judgment clause on personal loans of $2,000 or less); NEv. REV. STAT.
§ 675.350 (1960); S.C. CODE § 8-794.7 (1952); UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-10-14 (1953); WASH.
REV. CODE § 31.08.150 (1952).
119 N.D. REv. CODE § 51.1302(13) (Supp. 1959).
120 CAL. Civ. CODE, § 1804.1c (retail credit sales contracts), CAL. FIN. CODE § 18673
'industrial loans), CAL. FIN. CODE § 22467 (personal property brokers), CAL. FIN. CODE
.22468 (small loans); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. 36-236 (1958) (small loan contracts), 2-88
1958) (retail sales contract); MD. ANN. CODE art. 58A, § 19 (1957) (small loans), art. 11,
- 198 (1957) (industrial finance contracts), art. 83, § 130 (1957) (retail installment contracts,
! 2,000 or less where the seller has retained a security interest); Ml-,N. STAT. § 56.12
(957) (small loans), § 168.71A(2) (1947) (motor vehicle retail sale); N.Y. BANKING LAWS
I 353 (small loans), N.Y. PEPs. PROP. LAWS § 302(13) (retail installment contracts); ORE.
COGNOVIT JUDGMENTS
In the four states having no general statutes, 121 three prohibit their use by
small loan companies, 22 and one says no in automobile retail sales.12 3
Out of this welter of partial and complete regulation there emerges a general
pattern of restriction. This pattern shows, over the past fifty years, a slow but
persistent increase in the number and types of restrictions. Although there is
some indication that in the last ten years the state legislatures have tightened
up these restrictions, 24 there has been no dramatic rewriting of the prohibi-
tion statues. However, only Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Ohio specifically allow
for and do not, in some way, restrict cognovits. They stand in splendid isola-
tion, and, understandably, it is these states that produce the overwhelming
bulk of cognovit judgments. 25
The total impact of this legislative policy suggests, however, that there is a
growing, and with a few notable exceptions, a near unanimous feeling of dis-
taste for this time-honored method of obtaining jurisdiction.
State supreme court cases also evidence a distaste toward cognovits. The
existing case law can be divided into two categories. First there are those cases
construing the local substantive and procedural rules on cognovits. Here dis-
taste is well illustrated by the extreme liberality of trial courts in opening up a
cognovit judgment on a showing, however weak, by the defendant that he has
a substantive defense.126 Consistently, in the rare attempts to use cognovits in
states that place restrictions on them,127 the court can be tough. For instance,
in Barnes v. Hilton,128 the California Court of Appeals displayed its displeas-
REv. STAT. § 83.670(1) (1950) (motor vehicle retail sales), § 725.050 (1955) (small loans).
Idaho, Iowa, Nebraska, and South Dakota adopted general retail or motor vehicle retail
sales acts, but did not add to their general procedural limitations on cognovits. North Caro-
lina, Oklahoma and Wyoming likewise ignored anti-cognovit clauses in their small loan
laws. Kansas ignored cognovits in both types of acts.
121 See note 91 supra.
122 ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 59, § 220 (1954); N.H. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 399.28 (1955);
R. I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 19-25-24 (1956).
123 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-16-6(l)(b) (1953). Maine and New Hampshire have
motor or general retail sales acts but no restrictive clause. Colorado has a small loan law
without restriction.
124 This increase mainly occurs in the new sales finance acts in which many states have
included anti-cognovit sections.
125 See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
12 6 See, e.g., Thrifti-Pak Home Appliance, Inc. v. Kowalcayk, 22 MI1. App. 2d 536, 161
N.E.2d 344 (1959); L. & N. Sales Co. v. Stuski, 188 Pa. Super. 117, 146 A.2d 154 (1958),
where appellate courts reversed trial courts refusal to open. See also Note, 102 U. PA. L.
REv. 524,531-32 (1954); Hunter, The Warrant of Attorney to Confess .udgment, 8 OHIo ST.
L.J. 1, 12-16 (1941), for a discussion of the local practice. Several attorneys for finance com-
panies pointed out that it is a common practice for trial judges to freely allow the defendant's
motion. See note 65 supra and accompanying text.
127 See note 92 supra and accompanying text.
12S 118 Cal. App. 2d 108, 257 P.2d 98 (1953).
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ure by allowing a defendant to vacate a trial court judgment based upon a
cognovit. The California Code29 requires the defendant to verify by oath the
fact that he owed the money before a plaintiff may take judgment by confes-
sion. The plaintiff tried to use an ordinary cognovit clause and had the attor-
ney acting under that clause file the proper oath. The clause itself was unveri-
fied. The court said "[If [plaintiff's) arguments were upheld, then the provi-
sions of the code here involved could readily be converted by the simple device
of including in any promissory note a warrant of attorney, whereby any at-
torney could make a statement in writing, verify it, and could pass judgment.
Clearly, such is not the policy contemplated by the legislature."30 There are
other examples of local dissatisfaction,131 but none of successful constitutional
attacks.132
The other large area of litigation occurs when the lender attempts to en-
force its Fl cognovit judgment in F2. Here the F2 court is faced with a consti-
tutional demand that it give full faith and credit to the judgment of a sister
state. Since most states limit the use of cognovits, in one fashion or another,
F2 normally has a local policy inimical to the foreign judgment.
129 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1133.
130 118 Cal. App. 2d at 111, 257 P.2d at 99. This approach should be contrasted to that
of the Kansas Supreme Court. In Barnes v. Hilton, 172 Kan. 345, 239 P.2d 236 (1952), the
Kansas Supreme Court, sitting as an F2 court in a suit on the original trial court judgment
in the above case, held that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment despite the defendant's
argument that the cognovit clause did not authorize the attorney to file the verified oath re-
quired by the California statute. The court suggested two reasons. First that the cognovit
authorized the attorney's oath, and secondly, citing an earlier non-cognovit clause case,
Smith v. State, 64 Kan. 730, 68 Pac. 641 (1902), that in Kansas, as between the parties, the
affidavit is not required. The second reason may make sense in-terms of the fact that the
procedural statutes were to cover confessions after suit was filed in any type of case, not just
to cover cognovits as a basis ofjurisdiction. If the reason for the statute is to protect creditors
against a debtor confessing judgment to a "friend" in order to escape paying his real credi-
tors, there is no need to protect the defendant by having him file an affidavit. See Note, 21
NOTRE DAME LAw. 187, 188 (1946), where the writer discusses some early Indiana cases
taking the Kansas view at a time when Indiana had a California-Kansas type statute.
In those states with California-Kansas type limitation statutes, a lender may be able to
induce the court to follow the Kansas example and either to waive the requirement of an
affidavit as between the parties or to allow the cognovit clause to contain an authorization
that the attorney file the affidavit. If successful, this argument might increase the number
of states in which a cognovit could be used.
131 See, e.g., General Contract Purchase Corp. v. Max Keil Real Estate Co., 35 Del. 531,
170 At. 797 (Super. Ct. 1933); First Nat'l Bank v. White, 220 Mo. 117, 120 S.W. 36
(1909). Even in the states where cognovits are popular, the court may get testy. In Frantz
Tractor Co. v. Wyoming Valley Nursery, 384 Pa. 213, 120 A.2d 303 (1956), the court
vacated a concession judgment when the cognovit clause appeared on the reverse side of an
equipment lease on the grounds that the defendant had signed only on the front. The
court's language is particularly vehement.
132 Most of the local cases are beyond the scope of this study since they decide questions
of local procedure only. For a detailed review of these cases in various states, see Hunter,
The Warrant of Attorney to Confess Judgment, 8 Omo ST. L.J. 1 (1941) (Ohio); Note, 102
U. PA. L. Rzv. 524 (1954) (Pennsylvania); Note, 21 NoTRE DAME LAW. 187 (1946) (Indiana).
For a more limited review, see Note, 46 ILL. L. Rav. 642 (1951) (Illinois).
COGNOVIT JUDGMENTS
A review of the traditional wisdom133 illustrates a wide variety of attempts
by the defendant, sometimes successful, to induce F2 to give effect to its local
policy.134 Defendants' claims divide into five areas: (1) The local policy of F2
is a sufficient reason for denying full faith and credit; (2) A cognovit judgment
violates due process in that the defendant ha: no notice or opportunity to
defend; (3) In "fact" the cognovit did not grant jurisdiction to Fl; (4) There
is a valid defense under the law of Fl; and (5) In "law" the consent did not
give jurisdiction to Fl since the consent was prohibited by its "proper"
law.135
The first two claims do not convince F2 courts. They proclaim that a local
policy inimical to cognovits is an insufficient ground for denying full faith and
credit.136 The extremely common argument that lack of notice and oppor-
tunity to defend deprived the defendant of due process of law, is also singu-
larly unsuccessful. Normally there is no discussion.137
133 The proper (constitutional) approaches that an F2 court may use will be discussed in
the third section of this article.
134 Or on occasion the policy of some third state.
135 On occasion an F2 court will base its decision on some other ground. One semi-popu-
lar method of preventing a plaintiff from enforcing his judgment is to find that the plaintiff
has procedurely failed to show the validity of the Fl judgment. The plaintiff may fail to
show that Fl authorizes cognovits. Since F2 prohibits or limits them, the court rules that it
will assume that, without a showing by plaintiff, the law of Fl must be the same as that of F2
See, e.g., United Mercantile Agencies v. Bissonnette, 155 Fla. 22, 19 So. 2d 466 (1944);
McNair v. Underwood, 55 Okla. 585, 155 Pac. 553 (1916). Sometimes plaintiff loses merely
because he does not correctly present a transcript of the Fl judgment. See, e.g., Picking v.
Local Loan Co., 185 Md. 253, 44 A.2d 462 (1945). Compare Bonnet-Brown Sales Serv. v.
Utt, 323 Mo. 589, 19 S.W.2d 888 (1929), where the transcript was apparently correct, but the
wording of the llinois judgment was faulty. See Annot., 162 A.L.R. 685 (1946). Other de-
fendants have successfully argued the escape device of fraud in the procurement. See, e.g.,
Consumer Credit Co. v. Bowers, 143 W. Va. 748, 104 S.E.2d 869 (1958)(signature of de-
fendant to cognovit obtained through fraud), or the non-finality of the judgment. See, e.g,
Suydam v. Bank of Silver Spring, 233 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1956). In Bland v. White,; 138
Misc. 715,246 N.Y.S. 532 (1930), and Baldwin Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Klein, 136 Misc. 752
240 N.Y.S. 804 (Sup. Ct.), aff'dmem., 230 App. Div. 830,244 N.Y.S. 899 (1st Dep't. 1930),
44 HAiv. L. Rnv. 1275 (1931), the New York courts refused to give full faith and credit be-
cause defendants were residents of New York.
136 See, e.g., W. H. Barber Co. v. Hughes, 223 Ind. 570,63 N.E.2 417 (1945); Wedding
v. First Nat'l Bank, Inc., 280 Ky. 610, 133 S.W.2d 931 (1939); McDade v. Moynihan,
330 Mass. 437, 115 N.E.2d 372 (1953), 39 A.L.R.2d 1232 (1955). Almost all of the cases
cited in the subsequent notes specifically so hold. In Monarch Refrigerating Co. v. Faulk,
228 Ala. 554, 155 So. 74 (1934), the Alabama court denied full faith and credit on other
grounds, but also suggested that since cognovits were locally against public policy, it could
deny a court the enforcement of the Fl judgment, citing Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127
U.S. 265 (1888), and Anglo-American Prov. Co. v. Davis Prov. Co., 191 U.S. 373 (1903).
However, in Ohio Bureau of Credits v. Steinberg, 29 Ala. App. 515, 199 So. 246 (1940),
the court recognizes that this approach is no longer valid, citing Titus v. Wallick, 306 U.S.
282 (1939).
137 See, e.g., Turner v. Alton Banking & Trust Co., 181 F.2d 899 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 833, rehearing denied, 340 U.S. 885 (1950); Bond v. Farmers & Merchants Nat'l
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Defendants frequently realize that local policy and lack of notice are not
going to be sufficient. So they claim that lack of jurisdiction in F1 is a suf-
ficient ground for F2 to refuse full faith and credit. This claim is supported in
various ways. F2 courts allow defendants to successfully show that in "fact"
no consent was given by showing that the defendant did not sign the note,
1 38
that the cognovit clause was forged,139 that the contract, containing the cogno-
vit, was rescinded for fraud,140 or that the defendant was not authorized to
sign the cognovit.141 Sometimes, relying on two United States Supreme Court
cases,1 42 the F2 court finds by giving a "strict" construction to the grant of
power in the cognovit that in "fact" consent was not given. 43
Rarely, a defendant will argue, sometimes successfully, that under the sub-
stantive or procedural law of Fl the cognovit did not give the F1 court juris-
diction or rendered the judgment void and subject to collateral attack.144
Bank, 64 Cal. App. 2d 842, 149 P.2d 722 (1944); Cocke v. Truslow, 91 Ga. App. 645, 86
S.E.2d 686 (1955); Dickson v. Lindsey, 234 Miss. 684, 107 So. 2d 732 (1958); Hazel v. Jacobs,
78 N.J.L. 459, 75 Ati. §03 (1910).
In Eilwanger v. Agostos, 255 S.W.2d 492 (Ky. 1953), the defendant argued that the Il-
linois judgment contravened the Kentucky constitution in that it deprived her of her day in
court. The Kentucky Supreme Court had no trouble in denying this plea. For additional dis-
cussion and cases, see Annot., 39 A.L.R.2d 1232, 1235 (1955).
138 First Nat'l Bank v. Brown, 119 Fla. 761, 162 So. 142 (1935).
139 Anderson v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 281 Ky. 531, 136 S.W.2d 741 (1940).
140 Brone v. Golde, 267 N.Y. 284, 196 N.E. 58 (1935).
141 In Monarch Refrigerating Co. v. Farmers' Peanut Co., 74 F.2d 790 (4th Cir. 1935),
the court rejected the defendant's argument that the officers of a corporation had no power
to sign a cognovit on the grounds that the local anti-cognovit statute was only procedural.
However, the case was remanded so that the defendant could show, by answer, that in fact
the officers were not authorized.
142 National Exch. Bank v. Wiley, 195 U.S. 257 (1904); Grover & Baker Mach. Co. v.
Radcliff, 137 U.S. 287 (1890). Not all the cases cite these two cises, but they should, as they
are the constitutional authority.
143 See, e.g., Bower v. Casanave, 44 F. Supp. 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) (defense that the plain-
tiff not the owner or holder sustained); Gundlach v. Park, 140 Minn. 78, 165 N.W. 969,
aff'd on rehearing, 140 Minn. 78, 167 N.W. 302 (1918) (judgment broader than cognovit);
Bonnet-Brown Sales Serv. v. Utt, 323 Mo. 589, 19 S.W.2d 888 (Ct. App. 1929) (cognovit
granted power to attorney; no showing that attorney appeared); Antonelli v. Silvestri,
137 N.E.2d 146 (Ohio App. 1955) (name of plaintiff not clear in cognovit, judgment taken
by an "esquire").
14 See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Cunningham, 48 Fed. 510 (D. Ky. 1891) (citing F1 law
that payment prior to judgment renders the judgment void since the consent disappears);
Markham v. Nisbet, 60 So. 2d 393 (Fla. 1952) (citing F1 law that if the Fl statute of limita-
tions has run the cognovit is void); Gordon v. Heller, 271 Mich. 240, 260 N.W. 156, cert.
denied, 296 U.S. 619 (1935) (same); Wilensky v. Miller, 257 Wis. 589,44 N.W.2d 521 (1950)
(citing Fl law that the dissolution of a joint corporate maker voids the cognovit).
In several cases the defendant cited Fl law but the court granted full faith and credit on
the grounds that the defendant had not sho%%n, under the law of Fl, that the Fl judgment
was in any way invalid. See, e.g., Turner v. Alton Banking & Trust Co., 181 F.2d 899 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 833, rehearing denied, 340 U.S. 885 (1950) (statute of limitations,
COGNOVIT JUDGMENTS
The most interesting area of attack turns on inducing the F2 court to com-
bine concepts of choice of law and lack of jurisdiction. If all of the elements of
the transaction-place of making, place of performance, place intended by
the parties, place with the most significant contacts-occur in the state render-
ing judgment, F2 will almost automatically give full faith and credit to the Fl
judgment. 145 But, if one or more of these elements occur in the F2 state or in
some third state, the defendant argues that the "proper" law governing the
contract, and hence the validity of the consent, is some law prohibiting or lim-
iting cognovits. Whether the defendant is successful depends, for almost all
F2 courts, on which contract choice of law rule the F2 court adopts. Fre-
quently the F2 court will adopt as the "proper" law, the place of the making of
the note. If that "place"' 46 is in a state allowing cognovits,147 F2 will give full
faith and credit.148 If it is a state prohibiting or limiting cognovits, 149 F2 will
refuse to give full faith and credit.150 In "place of making" cases the courts
judgment not in county where executed, cognovit exhausted after original judgment);
Monarch Refrigerating Co. v. Farmers' Peanut Co., 74 F.2d 790 (4th Cir. 1935) (judgment
on an unliquidated amount); Dickson v. Lindsey, 234 Miss. 684, 107 So. 2d 732 (1958)
(judgment before maturity of note). In Smith v. Swart, 103 N.J.L. 150, 134 Atl. 755 (1926),
the court denied defendant the right to attempt to show that the Fl judgment was on an
unliquidated amount. On occasion the defendant does not cite the Fl law which might void
the judgment and the F2 court treats the issue as being on the merits and so foreclosed. See,
e.g., Hazel v. Jacobs, 78 N.J.L. 459, 75 Atl. 903 (1910) (defendant claimed payment prior to
the F1 judgment).
145 See, e.g., Cocke v. Truslow, 91 Ga. App. 645, 86 S.E.2d 686 (1955) (court found it
immaterial that defendant was a Georgia resident); McDade v. Moynihan, 330 Mass. 437,
115 N.E.2d 372 (1953); Dickson v. Lindsey, 234 Miss. 253, 107 So. 2d 732 (1958).
146 The courts frequently manipulate what constitutes "making" in order to arrive at the
result it wants. Typical examples include Loundonville Milling Co. v. Davis, 248 Ala. 202,
27 So. 2d 6 (1946), where the court equated "making" with the signing of the note. The note
was signed in Alabama and was to be accepted in'Ohio. In Note, 8 ALA. LAw. 178 (1947), the
student writer is horrified at this manipulation to help an Alabama citizen. In Ohio ex rel.
Squire v. Eubank, 295 Mich. 230, 294 N.W. 166 (1940), the court found a renewal note
"made" in Ohio, although signed in Michigan.
147 Normally Fl.
14s Turner v. Alton Banking & Trust Co., 181 F.2d 899 (8th Cir.) cert. denied, 340 U.S.
833, rehearing denied, 340 U.S. 885 (1950); Ohio Bureau of Credits v. Steinberg, 29 Ala. App.
515, 199 So. 246 (1940); Carroll v. Gore, 106 Fla. 582, 143 So. 633 (1932).
149 Normally F2.
150 See, e.g., Monarch Refrigerating Co. v. Faulk, 228 Ala. 554, 155 So. 74 (1934)
(also relied on the old right to deny a court to a foreign cause of action); Pearson v. Fried-
man, 112 So. 2d 894 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (but some indication that the F1 choice of
law rule was important. Id. at 895 n.2); Acme Feeds, Inc. v. Berg, 231 Iowa 1271,4 N.W.2d
430 (1942); Jones v. Turner, 249 Mich. 403, 228 N.W. 796 (1930); Bernard Gloeckler Co. v.
Baker Co., 52 S.W.2d 912 (Tex. Civ. Ct. App. 1932) (also relied on assumed intention ofthe
parties).
Even Fl courts will renounce jurisdiction on occasion when the defendant convinces it
that by the law controlling the cognovit, determined by Fl's choice of law rule, the cognovit
did not grant Fi jurisdiction. See, e.g., Gramatan Nat'l Bank v. Barron, 193 Md. 649, 69
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talk in terms of the non-existance of a valid consent.15'
Other contact points used to find the proper law include: place of pay-
ment; 152 place of expressed153 or assumed intention of the parties;154 or the
so-called "center of gravity" (place of most significant contacts).SS No matter
what contact point or combination of contact points the F2 courts find de-
terminative of the "proper" law governing the contract, they all assume, with-
out discussion, that it is the F2 choice of law rule that determines the "proper
law." No case was found in which F2 felt compelled to use Fl's choice of law
rules.15 6
A.2d 489 (1949), 19 A.L.R.2d 540 (1951); Albert v. Sitton, 170 N.E.2d 925 (Ohio Ct. Com.
Pl. 1959). But see Davis v. Wirth, 249 Ill. App. 544 (1928) and Davis v. Mosbacher, 252 111.
App. 536 (1928) where the Fl court apparently found the proper law to be that of the place
"where it is delivered." Id. at 543. The fact that the "place of making" statute only places
procedural limitations or by its terms prohibits the entering of judgment by the "place of
making" courts rather than rendering the cognovit clause void does not bother F2 courts
pr6tecting the local citizen. See, e.g., Loundonville Milling Co. v. David, 248 Ala. 202, 27
So. 2d 6 (1946); Acme Food Co. v. Kirsch, 166 Mich. 433, 131 N.W. 1123 (1911). But
see Gotham Credit Corp. v. Powell, 22 N. J. Misc. 301, 38 A.2d 700 (1944), where the court
found that although the note was executed in New Jersey, the local statute was procedural
and should not have extraterritorial force. In Gramatan Nat'l Bank v. Barron, supra, the
Maryland court, an Fl court, refused jurisdiction when the note, executed in Virginia, did
not specify a particular attorney. The Virginia statute so required prior to entry of judgment
in Virginia.
151 See, e.g., Monarch Refrigerating Co. v. Faulk, supra note 150; Acme Food Co. v.
Kirsch, supra note 150; Bernard Gloeckler Co. v. Baker Co., supra note 150. Although not
mentioned by any of the cognovit cases, the argument would seemingly involve the famous
logical problem known as the Bootstrap Doctrine. "But an agreement is not a contract,
except as the law says it shall be, and to try to make it one is to pull on one's bootstraps."
Per Judge Hand in E. Gerli & Co. v. Cunard S. S. Co., 48 F.2d 115, 117 (2d Cir. 1931).
Today the Bootstrap is no longer bothersome. RESTATEmENT (SEcoND), CoNFLICr Or LAWs
§ 332a (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1960).
152 See, e.g., South Orange Trust Co. v. Barrett, 76 A.2d 310 (Del. Super. Ct. 1950)
(Maryland judgment, payable in New Jersey; full faith and credit denied in Delaware since
New Jersey requires cognovit to be under seal); Egley v. T. B. Bennett & Co., 196 Ind. 50,
145 N.E. 830 (1924) (found to be Fl, judgment enforceable); Greenbaum Sons' Bank &
Trust Co. v. Porth, 116 Kan. 310,226 Pac. 747 (1924) (same); Wedding v. First Nat'l Bank,
280 Ky. 610, 133 S.W.2d 931 (1939) (presumed intention of the parties) (same).
153 Mountain States Fixture Co. v. Daskalos, 61 N.M. 491,303 P.2d 698 (1956) (found to
be Fl, judgment enforceable despite invalidity at place of making, F2).
ISA Bernard Gloeckler Co. v. Baker Co., 52 S.W.2d 912 (rex. Civ. Ct. App. 1932) (found
to be F2, judgment not enforceable).
155 W. H. Barber Co. v. Hughes, 223 Ind. 570, 63 N.E.2d 417 (1945). The court found
the contract to be governed by Illinois law even though signed in Indiana. In Spahr v. P. & H.
Supply Co., 223 Ind. 591 63 N.E.2d 425 (1945), the court found the contract to be governed
by Ohio law even though payable in Indiana. In both cases the "most" contacts occurred
in Fl.
156 See note 249 infra and accompanying text for a suggestion as to the unanimous error
of the Fl courts.
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DuE PRocEss AND FULL FArm AND CREDIT
A critical review of the attitudes and practices of the finance industry and
of the traditional legislative and judicial wisdom suggests the desirability of a
revaluation of the status of cognovits. While state legislatures could act, the
possibility of such a revaluation is likely to arise out of the new concepts in due
process and full faith and credit.
Due Process
First, the due process argument may arise when some defendant appeals to
the United States Supreme Court from an F1 court denial of his plea that
cognovits violate the fourteenth amendment. The defendant has two theories
to urge. He could suggest that by 1961, "consent," when embodied in a cogno-
vit clause, is not a reasonable contact,15 7 and so is not a basis for in personam
jurisdiction. He could also argue that even if "consent" were sufficient, any
statute or procedure that does not require notice violates due process.
The arguments against a defendant succeeding on his first theory are im-
pressive. Neither text writers 58 nor the second edition of the Restatement, 59
see any problem in consent jurisdiction, cognovit or otherwise. Even Professor
Ehrenzweig finds only an extremely remote procedural due process argu-
ment.160 And Professor Paulsen maintains: "Perhaps, judgments grounded in
these consents [cognovits] are not in accordance with 'fundamental principles
of justice and fair play.' There is little to suggest that the court [United States
Supreme Court] would take that tack, involving, as it would, the outlawing of
cognovit notes in those states which have seen no need to forbid them."' 6'
Lower federal and state judicial opinions give little hope. 62 The United
157 See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
158 GooDRIcH § 73, at 196; LEFLA §29; SnumBrEo 81.
159 RSTAT ENT (SECOND), CoNmtcr or LAws § 81 (rent. Draft No. 3,1956). See note 8
supra.
160 Professor Ehrenzweig states that consent is a valid basis of jurisdiction. EmRENZWEIG
§ 27, at 89. In § 55 concerning recognition of F1 judgments, he discusses cognovits under
"Unfair Procedure" and impliedly finds that they are not unfair. See note 242 infra and ac-
companying text for a fuller discussion.
161 Paulsen, Enforcing the Money Judgment of a Sister State, 42 IowA L. REv. 202, 210
(195).
16z No F2 court has given dignity to a defendant's plea that jurisdiction based on a cogno-
vit is invalid, even when he argued lack of notice and opportunity to defend. See note 137
supra. The question has been raised but seldom in an F1 court. Although not a true "cogno-
vit" case, in Green Mountain College v. Levine. 120 Vt. 332,139 A.2d 822 (1958), the college
obtained a signature of the defendant to a note which appointed the Vermont Secretary of
State to receive process. Despite the fact that there were no statutory provisions for the
Secretary receiving it, the court found that the defendant had consented to jurisdiction and
had waived any lack of power in the Secretary of State to forward notice. The court quoted
from Gilbert v. Burnstine, 255 N.Y. 348, 174 N.E. 706 (1931), an ordinary consent case, to
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States Supreme Court, although showing distaste, impliedly has recognized
their validity.163
Despite this monolithic approval, a few arguments are available to the
United States Supreme Court. If the test is that of "reasonableness," the Court
should distinguish between ordinary "consent" cases and those involving
"cognovits." While the argument favoring consent in Gilbert v. Burnsfine that
"Or government is not so paternalistic as to prevent them,"' 6 ' may well
apply to an ordinary "consent" agreement,16 5 it should not apply to an ad-
hesion cognovit note. Not only do courts protect the defendant from his
"choice" in an adhesion contract in the conflict of laws,16 6 but this man-child
the effect that individuals should be allowed to contract as they please so long as there is no
violation of a constitution or public morality. Apparently Vermont found none. That Ver-
mont prohibited a cognovit clause was not mentioned. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 4671
(1959).
Early cases like Hutchinson v. Palmer, 147 Ala. 517, 40 So. 339 (1906) and Houpt v.
Bohl, 71 Ark. 330, 75 $.W. 470 (1903), assume constitutionality without discussion.
Cases like Hamilton v. Schoenberger, 47 Iowa 385 (1877) and First Nat'l Bank v. White,
220 Mo. 717,120 S.W. 36 (1909), do not help the defendant. They do not allow a local cogno-
vit judgment, but do so on the basis of the lack of local statute or of a local public policy.
There is no suggestion that given a statute allowing such judgments, the courts would find
the policy strong enough to hold the statute unconstitutional.
163 National Exchange Bank v. Wiley, 195 U.S. 257 (1904); Grover & Baker Sewing
Mach. Co. v. Radcliffe, 137 U.S. 287 (1890).
164 255 N.Y. 348, 355, 174 N.E. 706, 707 (1931).
165 In Gilbert importers of zinc agreed to consent to arbitration in Great Britain.
16 Ehrenzweig, Adhesion Contracts in the Conflict ofLaws, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 1072 (1953).
He defines "adhesion" as "agreements in which one party's partitipation consists in his mere
'adherence' unwilling and often unknowing, to a document drafted unilaterally and insisted
upon by what is usually a powerful enterprise." Id. at 1075. Certainly to the bulk of defend-
ants, a cognovit note qualifies. Even a large corporate defendant may qualify. Pressure is
applied to the large defendant to sign a note containing the clause. See note 81 supra and
accompanying text. While there may be theoretical bargaining power between the parties, in
fact there probably is not, since the defendant would not be willing to lose the loan in order
to hold out for the removal of the cognovit clause. Professor Ehrenzweig takes a narrower
view, supra at 1076, but size does not necessarily determine adhesion. Not all terms of a con-
tract have equal bargaining weight. In the adhesion article, Professor Ehrenzweig cites usury
and insurance cases, but does not mention cognovits. However, in his major article on con-
tracts, Ehrenzweig, Contracts in the Conflict of Laws-Part One: Validity, 59 CoLUM. L. REv.
973 (1959), he cites, id. at 1020, cognovits as an exception to his Rule of Validation on the
grounds that the law of the lexfori is used, when there is a strong local policy, "to problems
connected with the enforcement process." Id. at 1019. In Frantz Tractor Co. v. Wyoming
Valley Nursery, 384 Pa. 213, 120 A.2d 303 (1956), the Pennsylvania court, although not
using the word "adhesion," vacated a cognovit judgment because the cognovit clause ap-
peared on the reverse side of an equipment lease and the defendant had signed only on the
front. The opinion is almost a classic example of a court manipulating normal contract rules
to nullify an adhesion contract. The language is particularly strong. In Note, 44 HARv. L.
REV. 1275 (1931), the writer makes an early attempt to equate cognovits with the concept of
an adhesion contract. He suggests that an F2 court might refuse to recognize an FI cognovit
judgment because the consent was obtained through "economic duress."
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is protected in many other areas in this highly complex world.' 67 Although
most writers have considered "adhesion" only in terms of manipulating sub-
stantive doctrines, in the name of public policy, to protect the little man, still
when the consequences are "unreasonable" in the jurisdictional sense, the
elevation of public policy to the due process level seems in order.
The editors of the Harvard Law Review, in their discussion of state court
jurisdiction,1 68 even suggest that, as to all consents prior to suit, the constitu-
tionality of the jurisdiction may depend on "the relative bargaining positions
of the parties and their reasons for having chosen the particular forum."169
They add: "[J]urisdiction should be disclaimed... in extreme cases, as a
matter of due process, when the note is coercive or involves the selection of a
grossly inconvenient fornm."170The argument against cognovit consent as a basis of jurisdiction might be
limited to the situation where the little defendant is a non-resident, on the
grounds that consent to jurisdiction in a local court is not a "grossly incon-
venient forum." Yet a resident of Springfield, Illinois, must travel further to
Chicago than must a resident of Gary, Indiana. If due process, in the future,
restricts the sheriff in serving the transient,17 1 the stay-at-home defendant,
even though "consenting," and a resident, should not have to travel the length
of the state. Certainly an "adhesion" cognovit is as "coercive" to a resident as
a nonresident.
As reported above, the industry attorneys are split, but many indicate that
cognovits are disliked, are used only because of the competition, and could be
outlawed without basically disrupting the finance industry. Granted that sev-
eral attorneys correctly argue that cognovits must be examined in terms of
other creditor remedies-garnishment and future assignment of wages-the
fact that other remedies may be distasteful does not force a conclusion that the
industry must be allowed the cognovit remedy. The argument that strong
remedies are needed to induce the finance industry to support the credit econ-
omy is greatly overworked. People borrow money in non-cognovit states.
Illinois practice is sordid. The fact that three states still allow their use seems
somewhat unnatural. This is not a new area of experimentation, but a dying
area hanging over from the nineteenth century and caveat emptor. Given al-
most universal condemnation by state legislation, hostility by many leaders in
the industry, increasing protection by the courts, and a general feeling of dis-
167 Oldfather, Complexity, Concentration and Children-The Significance of Insurance
Law, 9 KAN. L. REV. 1 (1960); Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Free-
dom of Contract, 43 CoLum. L. REv. 629 (1943).
168 Developments in the Law-State Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARv. L. REv. 909 (1960).
169 Id. at 944.
170 Id. at 945. 171 See EHuENzwEIO § 30.
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taste for such procedure, the United States Supreme Court might be willing to
break the whole field wide open.172
The broadside attack on the adhesion consent-the cognovit-may fail to
induce the Court to prohibit consent as a jurisdictional base. But in addition to
marshalling all of the general policy arguments against cognovits, the defend-
ant should also shout that when the cognovit does not, and it almost always
does not, provide for any notice to the defendant, it surely denies due process.
Notice, in in personam actions, has infrequently been a problem.17 3 Since
service of process and summons within the state was the traditional method of
obtaining jurisdiction, notice was part of the procedure of acquiring jurisdic-
tion. Early expansion of the jurisdictional base relied on the express or im-
plied consent of the defendant to the appointment of a statutory agent for the
service of process. 74 Again no problem of notice existed, since the agent re-
ceived notice and sent it on to the defendant. Later, with domicle7 5 or "mini-
mum contacts"1 7 6 as a jurisdictional base, the Court found mailed notice to
the defendant sufficient to meet the requirement of due process. Today the
fiction of service of process within the state is no longer needed. Notice is sent
directly to the out-of-state defendant.177
Early in the development of hew jurisdictional bases, the United States
Supreme Court struck down, in Wuchter v. Pizzutti,178 a non-resident motorist
statute. It made no provision for the Secretary of State to give mail notice to
the defendant. The Court said: "[A] provision of law for service that leaves
open such a clear opportunity for the commission of fraud.., or injustice is
not a reasonable provision, and.., would certainly be depriving a defendant
of his property without due process of law."'79 The Court brushed aside the ar-
gument from Hess v. PawloskiSO and other cases that the defendant had "con-
sented" to such service. This was "enforced acceptance."1l8
172 Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961), indicates that the United States Supreme
Court is willing to apply the fourteenth amendment to restrict a common law procedure in
a criminal action. Mere antiquity is no guarantee of due process. But see RErSATE MENT(SEcoND), CoNFLICT OF LAWS § 74, comment b, at 45 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1956): "Nor
is a common law ,rule [of jurisdiction] likely to be departed from on the ground that it is
uinreasonable."
173 See McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917) for the old lead case.
174 See, e.g., Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 H6w.) 404 (1856).
175 Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
176 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
177 See, e.g., Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia ex rel. State Corp. Comm'n, 339 U.S.
643 (1950); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (1959).
178 276 U.S. 13 (1928).
179 Id. at 19. 180 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
181 276 U.S. at 19. In Washington ex rel. Bond & Goodwin & Tucker, Inc. v. Superior
Court, 289 U.S. 361 (1933), the Court upheld a statute not requiring notice. However the
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Starting in 1950, the United States Supreme Court in a series of notice
cases re-examined the whole problem. In Mullane v. Central Bank & Trust
Co.,182 the Court refused to classify the case as in personam or in rem, but re-
quired, in a trust accounting case, "notice reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the ac-
tion . . ."183
The Court suggested that the defendant-trustee had a duty to search the rec-
ord to find names and addresses and once this was done, he should mail notice
to those addresses. In later cases,184 the Court reaffirmed and expanded the
new due process test. Although primarily in rem cases, the logic suggests that
in any action the best notice possible must be given. The plaintiff may only
plead undue burden in finding the defendant's address.1 85
The issue for cognovits, in light of these cases, resolves itself into a rela-
tively simple question: May a defendant "voluntarily" waive this due process
notice requirement prior to suit? As stated at the first of this article, the text
writers' 86 and the new Restatement of Conflicts 87 not only agree that consent
is valid, but that consent may waive any notice. But even if there were freedom
of contract in fact, freedom to waive such a jealously guarded right as notice
might well be doubted. If cognovits are adhesive, the defendant's "consent"
is no more than an "enforced acceptance," struck down in Wuchter v. Piz-
zutti. 188 A few dissenting judges' 89 and the editors of the Harvard Law Re-
Court used the now discredited distinction on the power of a state to exclude a foreign cor-
portation. The Court also pointed out that the corporation could have appointed someone
to receive process after it left the state.
182 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
183 Id. at 314.
184 Wisconsin Elec. Power Co. v. Milwaukee, 352 U.S. 948 (1956) (per curiam) (tax as-
sessment); Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956) (eminent domain); Covey v.
Town of Somers, 351 U.S. 141 (1956) (tax foreclosure); City of New York v. New York,
N.H. & H.R.R., 344 U.S. 293 (1953) (bankruptcy reorganization). In Walker v. City of
Hutchinson, supra, the Court required at least mail notice to a known resident in an eminent
domain proceedings.
185 The notice cases have occasioned a flurry of notes. See, e.g., Note, 70 HAMv. L. Rev.
1257 (1957); Note, 32 IND. L. REv. 469 (1957).
186 See note 12 supra. 187 See note 13 supra.
188 See Mr. Justice Brandeis' dissent, Mr. Justice Holmes concurring, in Wuchter v.
Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13, 25-28 (1928).
189 Justice Hulburd, with Justice Adams, of the Vermont Supreme Court, dissented in
Green Mountain College v. Levine, 120 Vt. 332, 139 A.2d 822 (1958), discussed in note 162
supra. He said: "Whether one expressly consents to jurisdiction or whether that consent may
be said to exist on the basis of a fiction as in the non-resident motorist cases, still notice to
the defendant is essential and where there is no such adequate provision for notice to the
defendant as to make it reasonably probable that such notice will be communicated to the
defendant, service is invalid as lacking due process of law." Id. at 339, 139 A.2d at 826. In
Midessa Television Co. v. Motion Pictures for Television, 290 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1961), an
ordinary consent case, the court gave full faith and credit to a New York judgment. While
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view190 are disturbed. The cognovit should be re-examined in the light of the
new cases.
The essence of the new notice cases1 91 is the belief that the defendant should
have notice. Only the necessities of business and the need for settling disputes
in one law suit allow a lesser standard. The finance industry has not shown that
even cognovits are needed. Certainly they have not shown that a consent to
jurisdiction and confession of judgment without notice is needed. The industry
could retain all of the legitimate advantages of cognovits--obtaining jurisdic-
tion over skipping or non-resident defendants; quick judgment on all valid
claims and the accompanying lien-and still give the defendant notice, either
personally or by mail to the last known address. Arguments of crowded court
calendars and insubstantial defenses are weak. If most claims are just, de-
fendants will not hire an attorney and defend. But at least the defendant would
have had notice!192 Requiring notice would have no effect in the area of con-
sent, actual or implied, after the suit is commenced. In those cases the defend-
ant is apprised of the suit and notice is not needed. Therefore, a holding of
unconstitutionality by the United States Supreme Court would not disrupt the
traditional "waiver of summons and entry of appearance." Nor need such a
holding in any way disrupt the right of a state to require a non-resident de-
fendant, be it a corporation or individual, to appoint a local agent for the
service of process. In such cases the defendant, through his appointed agent,
will receive notice.193
The time is now ripe for the United States Supreme Court to act. The de-
fendant can attack cognovit consent generally. Even if this fails, the argu-
denying defendant's plea that consent did not give 1 jurisdiction, the court stressed the fact
that the defendant had had notice. See also McCrairy v. Ware, 6 Kan. App. 155, 51 Pac. 293
(1897).
190 Developments in the Law-State Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARv. L. REv. 909, 944 (1960).
191 See cases cited notes 182 & 184 supra.
192 At least notice would prevent the courts from having to have a liberal and embarrass-
ing policy of reopening judgments to allow defenses. See note 126 supra and accompanying
text. The Maryland practice of requiring notice after judgment, MD. CODE ANN. GEN. RULEs
op PR. AND PRoc., RULE 645 (1957), and the new Illinois provision requiring a trial de novo
with notice prior to using a cognovit judgment as a basis for a "deduction order," ILL. REv.
STAT. ch. 62 § 82 (1961), are better than nothing. In Pennsylvania many judgments are
entered the day after the money is loaned in order to establish a lien on the borrower's
real estate. The judgment is a substitute for a mortgage. See Note, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 524
(1954). If the defendant understands that he is borrowing money on his real estate and giv-
ing, as security, an immediate judgment lien, he has notice that the suit will be filed the next
day. He could come in and defend. While such a device might be opposed by experts in
securities, it might not violate due process.
193 A justification for cognovit consent is based on the idea that the attorney acts as the
agent for the defendant. But this attorney can no more be considered the "agent" of the
defendant than could the trustee be considered the "caretaker" in Mullane v. Central Han-
over Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 316 (1950).
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mentst 94 will help set the stage for a convincing appeal that the presumption
is now against a defendant waiving his due process notice in an adhesion con-
tract. The burden should be on the industry to show why it need take a judg-
ment without notice. If no commercial reason is given, the court should be
free to find a violation of due process. With such a holding, the anomaly of the
cognovit clause-the procedure which allows judgment without notice-
would be laid to rest.
Full Faith and Credit
The second pesky problem facing the courts concerns the effect to be given
to a cognovit judgment obtained in Fl, when the attorney for the finance
industry seeks to use his Fl judgment to obtain a new judgment in F2. As
pointed out in the section on Traditional Wisdom, F2 courts have reacted in a
wide variety of ways to defendants' claims that F2 need not give full faith and
credit to an Fl cognovit judgment.
Although the actual number of cases decided by the United States Supreme
Court delineating the extent of the full faith and credit clause are not as nu-
merous as might be desired, the conflicts professors have worked out the bulk
of the "proper" rules.195 There are many requirements and defenses to the
full faith and credit clause,1 96 but lack of jurisdiction in the Fl court is the
major and most profitable way of avoiding it. The word "jurisdiction" is am-
biguous and encompasses several different ideas,19 7 but here includes only the
concept that the court rendering the judgment must be competent, i.e., au-
thorized by local law to render this class of judgment; and the court must have
control over the person against whom the judgment is directed. In cases where
the jurisdiction of the Fl court is based on some other contact than consent,
the United States Supreme Court has now settled that F2 need not give full
faith and credit to an Fl judgment when the Fl court lacked in personam
jurisdiction over the defendant. 98
194 See text following note 163 supra.
195 See, e.g., Emmzw~io §§ 45-92; Paulsen, Enforcing the Money Judgment of a Sister
State, 42 IowA L. REv. 202 (1957); Sumner, Full Faith and Credit for Judicial Proceedings, 2
U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 441 (1955).
196 That the decision must be on the merits; that it must be a final decision; that the F2
statute of limitations must not have run; that there must not be payment, release, accord and
satisfaction; and perhaps that there be no fraud nor the judgment be on a penalty. See au-
thorities cited note 195 supra for a thorough review of the requirements and defenses.
197 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICt OF LAws, CH. 4, Introductory Note 37 (Tent.
Draft No. 3, 1956).
198 Actually there is little "real" authority for this proposition. The texts and article
writers cite Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457 (1874), but it did not concern in
personam jurisdiction. The language in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 255 (1958), comes
the closest. However, in those cases where the Court finds Fl to have had in personamjuris-
diction, see, e.g., Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940), Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59
(1938). the Court leaves no doubt that lack of such jurisdiction would be grounds for F2 to
deny full faith and credit.
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In showing lack of jurisdiction, a defendant actually may show several dif-
ferent things: (1) that the law of F1 does not authorize this particular method
of acquiring jurisdiction; (2) that what the defendant has done does not fall
within the law; (3) that the jurisdictional law of F1 does not meet constitu-
tional due process.1 99 The due process attack may be divided into two parts:
(1) that the basis of in personam jurisdiction--domicile, "doing business,"
consent, or other contact--does not meet the minimum required under the
fourteenth amendment, and (2) that the notice required by Fl law does not
meet the fourteenth amendment's minimum standard.20 0
Some intriguing problems arise in applying these principles to in personam
jurisdiction based on a cognovit clause. The defendant could, of course, argue
the third requirement that the F1 law allowing in personam jurisdiction by
consent violated due process either because consent, under the circumstance,
was not a reasonable contact or because notice was non-existent. This argu-
ment is the same as that made by the defendant in the F1 court discussed
above. The argument need not be repeated here. But the defendant might fare
better on the state court level making this attack in F2; especially if F2 had a
strong policy against the use of cognovits!
If this proves unsuccessful, the defendant may return to the first require-
ment and claim that the law of F1 does not provide for confession of judg-
ments or for this particular type of confession judgment. In Adam v. SaengerOl
the United States Supreme Court made clear that the interpretation of the
jurisdictional law of Fl, if not litigated there, may be litigated in F2. And since,
said the Court, the same full faith and credit shall be given to the F1 proceed-
ings "as they have by law or usage" of that state, the federal right turns on the
meaning of the Fl statute. 202 In Adam the F1 statute was clearly jurisdictional
199 Professor Sumner lists four grounds: (1) Authorization for the exercise of power;
(2) Constitutional contact of the defendant with the state; (3) Due process notice; and (4)
"[F]acts to sustain these prerequisites." Sumner, Full Faith and Credit for Judicial Proceed-
ings, 2 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 441,453 (1955). He cites McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917)
and Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940), as showing these requirements. Id. at 453 n.55.
Paulsen lists only two grounds: (1) Fl local law giving the court power to act and (2) the
meeting of constitutional standard in the granting of the power. Paulsen, Enforcing the
Money Judgment of a Sister State, 42 IowA L. REv. 202, 208 (1957). He cites, generally,
Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457 (1873). All three classifications are basically
the same.
200 See cases cited notes 3, 9 & 10 supra and accompanying text (minimum contact) and
notes 182 & 184 supra and accompanying text (due process notice) for a discussion of the
standards.
201303 U.S. 59 (1938).
202 Id. at 64. The "law and usage" language comes from the statute implementing the
full faith and credit clause. 62 Stat. 947 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1958). The Court also
pointed out that it is free to independently determine the Fl law, since it has as much com-
petence as the F2 court. In Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), the Court used the
right of F2 to examine the law of F1 to sustain a Delaware court in refusing to grant full
faith and credit to a Florida judgment. The Court found that Florida did not have in per-
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in nature. However, as pointed out by both Professors PaulsenN3 and Le-
flar,204 many errors of procedure may exist in an F1 judgment which may or
may not render the Fl judgment void and subject to collateral attack in Fl
even though the FL court has "jurisdiction" in the interstate sense. 205 It is not
clear whether F2 may use these defects under the "law or usage" language.
Since the defendant may go to F1 and attack the judgment and since judg-
ments may be opened in Fl on a broad range of grounds, Professor Paulsen
recommends not allowing F2 to re-examine.2n 6
While entertaining the same worries as Professor Paulsen, Professor Leflar
feels F2 should be allowed to check.107 "[O]therwise a judgment invalid where
rendered would be valid and enforceable everywhere else." 208
There is a rather surprising lack of reliance on the first requirement by F2
courts in cognovit cases. 209 The reason is unknown, but perhaps it is difficult
for them to show what voids an FL judgment in F1 or perhaps it is the re-
sonam jurisdiction over one defendant. Since under Florida law, this defendant was "an
indispensable party," the F2 court did not have to give full faith and credit to any part of
the judgment.
203 Paulsen, Enforcing the Money udgment of a Sister State, 42 IowA L. REv. 202, 204-06
(1957).
204 LnrtaR § 75.
205 See generally Comment, 66 YALE L.J. 526 (1957).
206 Paulsen, supra note 203, at 206. The leading English case of Pemberton v. Hughes
[1899] Ch. 781. takes this view as does the RESrATEMENT, CorNucr oF LAws § 432 (1934).
Paulsen, supra note 203, at 206 n.20, cites Barnes v. Hilton, 172 Kan. 345, 239 P.2d 966
(1952), as employing his suggestion. There, the Kansas Supreme Court gave full faith
and credit to a California cognovit judgment when the defendant argued that the lack of an
affidavit rendered the judgment void. The court pointed out that the defendant could try to
set aside the California judgment. This the defendant did. Barnes v. Hilton, 118 Cal. App.
2d 108, 257 P.2d 98 (1953). Paulsen suggested that Kansas would subsequently vacate its
own judgment. Although partially due to procedural difficulties, it did not! Barnes v. Hilton,
178 Kan. 645, 290 P.2d 1024 (1955). See RESrATEMENTr (SEcoND), Cor-Licr oF LAWS § 81,
Comment d (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1956).
207 LEFLAR § 75.
208 Id. at 144.
209 See cases cited note 144 supra. A classic example of a successful attack occurred in
Wilensky v. Miller, 257 Wis. 589,44 N.W.2d 521 (1950). There the Wisconsin court refused,
after citing Illinois cases, to grant full faith and credit to a judgment obtained against a joint
maker of a cognovit when the other maker, a corporation, had been dissolved. The Wiscon-
sin court found that under Illinois law an Illinois court had no power to enter judgment
under such circumstances. An excellent illustration of the variety of approaches can be seen
in comparing First Nat'l Bank v. Cunningham, 48 Fed. 510 (D. Ky. 1891), Bower v. Casa-
nave, 44 F. Supp. 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1941), and Hazel v. Jacobs, 78 N.J.L. 459, 75 At. 903
(Ct. Err. & App. 1910). In Cunningham, supra, the court pointed out that under Illinois
law, prior payment of the note extinguished the cognovit and rendered the judgment void. In
Bower, supra, the court was quite willing to check F1 law, but found that under Illinois law
prior payment allowed only a collateral attack, consequently a defense of payment would be
relitigating the merits. In Hazel, supra, the court did not check Fl (Delaware). It merely held
that the question of prior payment went to the merits and could not be raised in F2.
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luctance of F2 courts to give a broad interpretation to "law and usage." 210
Most often a defendant, in the cognovit area, will attempt to argue, even
though he may not realize it, the second reason for "lack of jurisdiction," i.e.,
that the facts211 do not justify the use of the consent statutes of Fl since con-
sent was not in fact given. It is here that the peculiar nature of cognovit
clauses comes into play. There are several different ways a defendant might
attempt to show the "lack of consent." A very few cases illustrate what might
be designated as "true fact" cases, i.e., that the defendant did not sign the
note,212 that the cognovit clause was forged,213 that the contract containing
the cognovit was rescinded for fraud,214 or that the defendant was not au-
thorized to sign the cognovit.215
Then there are those cases which on the surface can be and normally are
classified as fact cases, but which actually present a mixture of "lack of fact"
and "lack of law" since, in one sense at least, the "lack of fact" is due to the
non-operation of some legal rule. The only two United States Supreme Court
cases on cognovit clauses illustrate this problem. 216 In National Exch. Bank
v. Wiley,217 the Court held that Nebraska did not have to give full faith
and credit to an Ohio judgment since the Nebraska jury found that the plain-
tiff was not actually the "holder" of the note, 218 and the cognovit clause au-
thorized only the "holder" to acquire jurisdiction. The Court, after a thorough
review of the Ohio cases, admitted that an Ohio court would probably find the
plaintiff a "holder." Yet the Court, citing old textbooks on bills and
notes,219 argued that one not the owner of the note could not "in law" be the
holder. The Court then cited 221 Thompson v. Whitman,222 and said that since
210 See authorities cited in notes 203 & 204 supra. On the right to collaterally attack in Fl,
see generally Comment, 66 YALE L. J. 526 (1957).
211 A good example of a "fact" case not involving cognovits is American Cas. Co. v.
Kincade, 219 Miss. 653, 69 So. 2d 820 (1954)(defendant not doing business in Fl).
212 First Nat'l Bank v. Brown, 119 Fla. 761, 162 So. 142 (1935).
213 Anderson v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 281 Ky. 531, 136 S.W.2d 741 (1940).
214 Brone v. Golde, 267 N.Y. 284, 196 N.E. 58 (1935).
21S Monarch Refrigerating Co. v. Farmers' Peanut Co., 74 F.2d 790 (4th Cir. 1935)
(defendants allowed to show, by answer, that the officers of the corporation were in fact not
authorized).
216 National Exch. Bank v. Wiley, 195 U.S. 257 (1904); Grover & Baker Mach. Co.
v. Radcliffe, 137 U.S. 287 (1890).
217 195 U.S. 257 (1904).
21s The plaintiff had apparently assigned the note to a third party who had returned it to
the plaintiff for the purposes of suit. Any monies collected would have gone to the third
party.
219 Id. at 268. The court cited Bn.rs oN Biais and I PARsoNs, BiLLS AND NoTEs.
220 Ibid.
221 Id. at 269. 22285 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457 (1873).
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there was no authority for the plaintiff to take the confession, Nebraska did
not have to give full faith and credit. "It [the judgment] was in such case, in
legal effect, a personal judgment without service of process upon the defend-
ants and without their appearance in person or by an authorized attorney.
The proceedings were wanting in due process of law."2 23
Earlier, in Grover & Baker Mach. Co. v. Radcliffe,224 the Court found that a
Pennsylvania judgment entered against the defendant by a prothonotary was
not binding on the Maryland court since the defendant in the cognovit clause
had authorized only an attorney to confess judgment. The Court said that
since the defendant did not "actually" consent, Maryland did not have to
recognize the Pennsylvania judgment. There was no in personamjurisdiction.
But the plaintiff showed, and the Court admitted, that the use of a pro-
thonotary without the attorney confessing judgment followed the law and
practice of Pennsylvania. The Court for a second reason relied on an argu-
ment of the defendant that since he could not know the laws of all the states
where the plaintiff might enter judgment, he had not, in fact, consented to
rules of law that created his consent in this fashion.
The Court also stated that Maryland was free to attack even though the
Pennsylvania judgment was valid in Pennsylvania. The Court said: "mhat, in
this respect [the right to attack jurisdiction of an Fl court], a court of another
state is to be regarded as a foreign Court...."225
These two cases are used by F2 courts 226 to justify giving a "strict construc-
tion" to the cognovit. If the F2 court finds that by some "law," usually their
own or by the law of the place of making or some other contact, the consent
was not in fact given, Fl had no jurisdiction.
Two questions arise. What type of "strict construction" did these two cases
allow to an F2 court, and would the Supreme Court continue to follow these
cases today?
In the Grover case, the Court bottomed its decision on three grounds:
(1) that the cognovit used only the word "attorney" so no "actual" consent
was given to a prothonotary; (2) that since the defendant did not know
where judgment would be entered, he had not consented to an interpretation
that an attorney included a prothonotary, i.e., lack of legislative jurisdiction;
and (3) that F2 may treat an Fl judgment as an extra-national judgment
on jurisdictional questions. In National Exch. Bank the Court talked, in
1 95 U.S. at 270.
224 137 U.S. 287, 298 (1890). 225 Id. at 294.
226 See cases cited note 143 supra. But see Greenbaum & Sons Bank & Trust Co. v.
Porth, 116 Kan. 310, 226 Pac. 747 (1924), where the Kansas Supreme Court, in answer to a
defendant's claim that the plaintiff was not the holder, said: "[Tihe plaintiff alleged that it
was the holder of the notes, and the court by its judgment necessarily so found .... " Id. at
314, 226 Pac. at 749. However, the court might have allowed the defendant to prove that in
"fact" the plaintiff was not the "holder." Id. at 314, 226 Pac. at 749.
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places,227 as if Ohio's interpretation of the word "holder" violated due process.
Actually the Court only held that to enter judgment without consent violates
due process. The lack of consent arose, reasoned the Court, since "in law" a
non-owner of a note may not be the holder.228 Surely these cases grant a large
measure of freedom to Fl to use any law to find no consent.
Which, if any, of these freedoms will the Court still follow today? By 1961
it is extremely doubtful that the Court would still treat a sister state judgment
in the same manner as an extra-national judgment. The great drive toward
full faith and credit 229 now blurs any distinction between local due process
jurisdiction and interstate jurisdiction. If the F1 court would find jurisdiction
and if that finding does not violate due process, F2 must give full faith and
credit.230
The view in National Exch. Bank and Grover that the F2 court has free-
dom to find that no consent was in fact given since, tested by some "proper"
or some super law, the cognovit cannot be interpreted to give the consent, will
probably no longer stand up. Cases like Adam v. Saenger23' certainly imply
that full faith and credit must be given if the Fl court correctly applied its own
statutory and case law and if that law was constitutional. In Adam, the Court
examined the California law and found "that the service in the California suit
was authorized by California law." 232 It is true that Adam explicitly concerned
a jurisdictional statute and not the existence of a "fact." But the breadth of the
227 "If law and usage in Ohio were to the contrary, then, such law and usage would be in
conflict with the Constitution. . . ." 195 U.S. at 269.
228 The "in law" language seems strange today. However, National Exch. Bank was de-
cided prior to Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). There was still a federal "com-
mon law."
229 See, e.g., Morris v. Jones, 329 U.S. 545 (1946); Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940);
Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59 (1938); Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268(1935); Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202 (1933); Fauntleroy v. Lur, 210 U.S. 230
(1908).
230 While interstate divorce jurisdiction may be an exception to this unity, the United
States Supreme Court, when squarely faced with the issue, avoided it in a split decision.
Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, 349 U.S. 1 (1955). Professor Ehrenzweig suggests that
as to extranational judgments, F2 courts will retain this right to examine jurisdiction under
the law and policy of the F2 court, but as to sister-state judgments, there now is the "identity
or near-identity" of local and interstate jurisdiction. EHRENZWEmi § 57, at 203. Yet in writ-
ing of in personam jurisdiction, he states that the plaintiff may attack Fl jurisdiction over the
person "although that court [Fl] may have found to the contrary." Id. at 205. Professor
Sumner states: "[lMt should be noted that if the basis of judicial jurisdiction of the first state
is valid under the Due Process Clause, it is immaterial whether it would be sufficient to
support a judgment in the second state, and due respect must be given." Sumner, Full Faith
and Credit for Judicial Proceedings, 2 U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 441, 454 (1955).
231 303 U.S. 59 (1938).
232 Id. at 67. Cf. Titus v. Wallick, 306 U.S. 282 (1939), where the Court examines Fl law
to determine if the plaintiff was entitled to bring the suit in Fl.
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consent becomes jurisdictional. If by the "law and usage" 233 of Fl, it would
find in "fact" that the consent existed234 and if that "law" does not violate due
process, F2 surely must give full faith and credit.235
The third basis for the judgment in Grover, that the defendant could not
have been deemed to have consented to the law and practice of Pennsylvania
since he could not reasonably be expected to have knowledge of that law or
that the plaintiff would take judgment there, undoubtedly is still valid since it
adjudicates the constitutionality of the F1 law as applied. The United States
Supreme Court has seldom spoken on "legislative jurisdiction,"236 but other
courts have used it to find that a defendant had not consented to the "laws"
of a foreign state.237 The new Restatement recognizes "legislative jurisdic-
tion" 238 and applies to it the same test of reasonableness as it does to judicial
jurisdiction. Consent is reasonable, 239 but if, on the facts, the defendant can-
not reasonably be said to have consented to the legislative jurisdiction of Fl,
the application of Fl's law would violate due process. Consequently, the F1
judgment would be void. Therefore, in the situation where the "fact" of con-
sent turns on the legal meaning of the language of the cognovit, the F2 court
may construe, but must use, Fl's law. Only when the application of the F1 law
would violate due process24O could F2 refuse to use the F1 law.241
233 "Such... judicial proceedings ... shall have the same full faith and credit in every
court ... as they have by law or usage in the courts... from which they are taken." 62
Stat. 947 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1958).
234 In Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945), the Court allowed a North Caro-
lina jury to find that the defendant was not in fact domiciled in Nevada, but the finding of
the Nevada court was entitled to prima facie weight. This right to attack the "facts" exists
for jurisdiction based on consent. But in Williams, the Court does not say that North Caro-
lina may use a different definition of domicile from that of Nevada. The Court points out
that the case involves "an historic notion common to all English-speaking courts, that of
domicil. . . ." Id. at 234. Moreover, in this case, the Fl law of domicile would have to fol-
low the United States Supreme Court's formulation in order for Nevada to have had inter-
state jurisdiction.
235 The Supreme Court's interpretation of the extent to which res judicata can be used to
foreclose jurisdictional questions offers another example of the importance of the "law and
usage" language. In Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951), the Court held that New
York must follow Florida's law on the extent to which res judicata bound third parties. See
EHRENZWEtO § 66 for further examples of Fl's law controlling.
236 Cf. Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941) on legislative jurisdiction in the criminal
law. Note also Thomas v. Matthiessen, 232 U.S. 221 (1914), where the Court finds that the
defendants had shown that they were consenting to California law.
237 See, e.g., Pope v. Heckscher, 266 N.Y. 114, 194 N.E. 53 (1934); Copin v. Adamson,
L. R. 9 Ex. 345 (1874).
238 REsTATEMENT (SEcOND), CoNFLicr OF LAws § 43e-f (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1956).
239 Id. at § 43f(l)(d) and comment g.
240 As pointed out in the text, the application of Fl law would violate due process if Fl
lacked legislative jurisdiction. It is also conceivable that even though F1 had legislative juris-
diction, the Fl law itself was so removed from reality that the application of the Fl law to
find the "fact" of consent would violate due process.
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Another reason for an F2 court to refuse to follow Fl's valid cognovit pro-
cedure is raised by Professor Ehrenzweig. In his book on conflicts he has a
section labeled "'Requirements of Recognition: Judgments; 3. Proper Pro-
curement, and Unfair Procedure." 242 He says that a difference in procedure,
unless it violates due process, is generally considered not a reason for refusing
to uphold the F1 judgment.243 But he then suggests that cognovits "disturb the
accuracy of this observation," 244 since some courts have refused recogni-
tion to cognovit judgments. He argues, however, that Fauntteroy v. Lur,245
"with its rigid standards of full faith and credit," 246 prohibits F2 from refusing
to give full faith and credit on the grounds that Fl's public policy is violated.
Certainly public policy on substantive matters is no longer a valid ground for
refusing recognition. Likewise as long as Fl's procedure does not violate due
process, F2 may not use its public policy to object to Fl using whatever
procedure it likes.247
Frequently the defendant will argue and the F2 court will use still another
technique to deny jurisdiction to Fl courts. This device is also an admixture of
jurisdictional fact and law, but differs as to the active ingredient. Before, the
court found that, by applying some law, a particular consent was not broad
enough to grant power to the F1 court. There was no "actual" consent to this
particular judgment. Under this later technique there is no question that the
consent was given and that it would, if effective, cover the FI judgment.
Rather the court finds that by the operation of some law no consent exists.
The actual consent is rendered legally void. The classic situation involves the
cognovit clause executed in an F2 state which prohibits its execution or use.
The note with the cognovit is then sent to a finance *company in Fl where the
company subsequently enters judgment, using the cognovit as the basis of
jurisdiction. The finance company then seeks to enforce its Fl judgment in
F2. The F2 courts248 approach this problem as one of finding the "proper
241 This same argument applies to the right of F2 to ignore Fl's choice of law rule. It may
do so only when Fl's choice is invalid because it violates due process or full faith and credit.
See note 265 infra and accompanying text.
2 42 EHPENZ EIG § 55.
243 Id. at 196. 245 310 U.S. 230 (1908).
244 bid. 246 EnRENZWEIG § 55, at 197.
247 Courts have not attempted to use "public policy" to any great extent. When all of the
operative facts occur in PI and no one raises any problems concerning the jurisdiction of the
Fl court under F1 law, F2 courts have been quite willing to grant full faith and credit to the
Fl judgment despite the fact that P2 would not take original jurisdiction under the cognovit
clause. See cases cited note 145 supra. When the court wishes to give effect to its local policy
on cognovits it uses other, frequently erroneous, devices to withhold recognition. Professor
Ehrenzweig suggests that the fact that a minority of states deny recognition in violation of
the full faith and credit clause attests to the strength of the local policy. Ehrenzweig, Con-
tracts in the Conflict of Laws-Part One: Validity, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 973, 1020 (1959).
248 See notes 146 to 156 supra and accompanying text.
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law" to govern the cognovit clause. If an independent determination by F2
discloses that the "proper law" renders the contract illegal, F2 finds the con-
tract and the consent void. A void consent cannot give jurisdiction to an F1
court, the F2 court concludes.
Patently, F2's right to attack the jurisdiction should not, today, extend this
far. As shown above,249 the law of Fl, not that of F2, determines the jurisdic-
tion of the F1 courts. Here, of course, the jurisdictional law in question is the
choice of law rule of Fl. If Fl's choice of law rule refers either to its own law
or to any law rendering the consent valid, then F1 does have jurisdiction and
F2 must give full faith and credit. This proposition was early recognized in a
student note in the Yale Law Journal.250 Professor Ehrenzweig apparently
takes the view, 251 and Professor Paulsen252 explicitly says that Fl's rule is
jhrisdictional.253 But no case has been found in which an F2 court felt bound
to examine Fl's choice of law rule.2 5 4
Even if the F2 court must follow the Fl's choice, it still has available all of
the usual methods of attacking jurisdiction. Since the legal existence of juris-
diction, here consent, depends upon the F1 choice of law rule and its constitu-
tionality, the F2 court has the opportunity to repeat its analysis of the jurisdic-
tion of the Fl courts. As discussed above255 the F2 court may check: (1)
whether the law of F1 gives Fl's courts jurisdiction, i.e., the choice of law
249 See note 231 supra and accompanying text.
25o Comment, Due Process and The Full Faith and Credit Clause, 34 YAE LJ. 886 (1925).
The student criticizes Egley v. T.B. Bennett & Co., 196 Ind. 50, 145 N.E. 830 (1924). In Egley
the F2 court treated the choice of law problem as if it had the right to determine the "proper
law" governing the cognovit. The court arrived at the apparently proper result by finding the
Fl law governed. But the vice of the Egley "proper law" approach is in the fact that other
F2 courts have a different choice of law rule. Consequently the "proper law" approach
allows F2's choice of law policy to be decisive. If local public policy is not a valid ground for
denying recognition, choice of law policy should fare no better.
251 EgNzwEIo § 55. He suggests that Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908), pre-
vents F2 from finding "inapplicable the law of the rendering ourt... ." Id at 197. The
"law" is apparently choice of law from the cases he cites.
252 Paulsen, Enforcing the Money Judgment ofa Sister State, 42 IowA L. REv. 202, 209-11"
(1957).
2S3 However, after he correctly suggests that F2 may challenge the constitutionality of the
F1 choice of law rule, he leaves somewhat open the question of F2's right to find a different
choice of law rule from that used by Fl. In one example, id. at 210, he says F's rule gov-
erns. Later, id. at 211, while suggesting that F2 may challenge the constitutionality of the F1
rule, he cites cases, e.g., Monarch Refrigerating Co. v. Faulk, 228 Ala. 554,155 So. 74 (1934),
where the F2 court did not raise the constitutional issue, but merely used their own choice of
law rule. Earlier he says that F2 will give full faith and credit when "defendant's consent is
validly given by the note (tested by the law governing the undertaking) ... ." Id. at 209 n.35.
(Emphasis added.)
254 In Pearson v. Friedman, 112 So. 2d 894 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959), the court cites F1
choice of law rules as being in accord with the F2 rule and "the prevailing conflict of laws
rule." Id. at 895.
25 See note 199 supra.
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rule of Fl refers to a law rendering the consent valid, (2) whether the facts
justify the application of this choice of law rule, and (3) whether the law is
unconstitutional. However, this time the "law" is the choice of law rule, not
the local rule allowing the use of cognovits.
To find the choice of law rule of F1 presents an unusually difficult task for
the F2 court.256 "Contracts is by common consent the most complex and also
the most confused part of conflict of laws." 25 7 Frequently one state will use,
simultaneously, different contact points.25 8 Consequently, general rules for
contract choice of law frequently mean little. With the new Restatement's
chapter on contract choice of law259 and with the massive and basic attacks on
traditional choice of law thinking in contract and other areas,26 0 there is little
reason to assume that existing choice of law rules will remain constant.
Theoretically F2 should see if Fl has decided what contact points are im-
portant when, in an adhesion contract, the borrower signed the contract in a
sister state; the lender was domiciled in and accepted the contract in Fl; and
the agreement provided that the law of F1 was to govern.2 61 But the confusion
surrounding almost all Fl's choice of law rules262 would seemingly allow, as a
256 Or for the attorney that has the burden of showing lack of jurisdiction in Fl. As
Ehrenzweig points out, Eanm Izwai § 57 at 205, § 59 at 211, the plaintiff may have the
burden of showing that the local law of F1 does provide for this type of jurisdiction. See
cases cited note 135 supra.
2S7 REs-ATEMENT (SECOND), CoNFIucr OF LAws, Ch. 8, Contracts, Introductory Note at I
(Tent. Draft No. 6, 1960).
258 See, e.g., Jones v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 158 Misc. 466, 286 N.Y.S. 4 (App. T.
1936).
259 REsrATEE r (SECOND), Coi-ucr OF LAws, Ch. 8, Contracts (Tent. Draft No. 6,
1960).
260 Professor Currie's articles, e.g., The Verdict of Quiescent Years: Mr. Hill and the Con-
flict of Laws, 28 U. Cm. L. REV. 258 (1961), Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in
Conflict of Laws, 1959 DutKE L. J. 171, Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in
Conflict-of-Laws Method, 25 U. Cm. L. REv. 227 (1958), have occasioned the most com-
ment. See, e.g., Hill, Governmental Interest and Conflict of Laws-A Reply to Professor
Currie, 27 U. Cm. L. REV. 463 (1960); Sumner, Choice of Law Rules: Deceased or Revised?,
7 U.C.L.A.L. REy. 1 (1960). Professor Ehrenzweig has been busy. See, e.g., Ebrenzweig,
Choice of Law: Current Doctrine and "True Rules," 49 CALrF. L. REv. 240 (1961); Ehrenz-
weig, Contracts in the Conflict of Laws (pts. 1-2), 59 CoLuM. L. REV. 973, 1171 (1959). As has
Professor Weintraub. See, e.g., Weintraub, The Contracts Proposals of the Second Restate-
ment of Conflicts of Laws-A Critique, 46 IOWA L. REV. 713 (1961); Weintraub, A Method
for Solving Conflict Problems, 21 U. PiTT. L. REV. 573 (1960).
261 Most of the form contracts furnished by the attorneys for the industry contain a clause
designating the law of a particular state to control the contract.
262 A hasty perusal of the choice of law rules of Illinois, a popular cognovit state, shows
the difficulty facing an F2 court. The Florida District Court of Appeals in Pearson v. Fried-
man, 112 So. 2d 894 (1959), could cite only three Illinois cases: Burr v. Beckler, 264 111. 230,
106 N.E. 206 (1914); Forsyth v. Barnes, 228 Ill. 326, 81 N.E. 1028 (1907); Barrow v. Phillips,
250 I1l. App. 587 (1928). Burr v. Beckler, supra, did not involve a cognovit clause. The court
found that the law of the place where a note was delivered by depositing in the mail con-
trolled and therefore the contract of the defendant, a married woman, was void. In Forsyth,
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practical matter, great freedom to the F2 court. F2 will undoubtedly exercise
this freedom, although the United States Supreme Court will sit in review of
supra, the court refused to give full faith and credit to an Ohio judgment on the grounds thatjurisdiction was obtained by a cognovit clause signed by a married woman in Ohio and
payable in that state. The court assumed the common law prevailed in Ohio and found that a
married woman's contract was void. Therefore there was no consent. In Barrow, supra, the
Illinois court opened up its own cognovit judgment on the grounds that the note was physi-
cally delivered in Florida and the rule of Forsyth controlled. But the Florida court did not
cite Davis v. Wirth, 249 Ill. App. 544 (1928), and Davis v. Mosbacher, 252 IIl. App. 536
(1928). In these cases, involving the same facts and parties, the court in refusing to open their
own cognovit judgment, pointed out that, although the defendant claimed that the note was a
Missouri contract, the declaration averred that it was delivered in Illinois and that the place
of delivery, not the place where the note was written, signed or dated, determined the place
of making. An Illinois attorney, in 1945, commented that a review of all the choice of law
contract cases suggested that the Illinois court would follow the expressed or presumed in-
tention of the parties. Bernhard, A Rationalization of the Illinois Conflict of Laws Rules
Applicable to Contracts, 40 ILL. L. REV. 165 (1945).
The Illinois statute allowing cognovits may contain a choice of law rule in the form of an
apparent venue requirement. The statute provides: "Tihe application to confess judg-
ment.., shall be made in the county in which the note... was executedor ... in which one
or more of the defendants reside or ... in which is located any property ... owned.., by
the defendants. A judgment entered by any court in any county other than those herein speci-
fied has no force or validity, anything in the power to confess to the contrary notwithstand-
ing." ILL. Rev. STAT. ch. 110, § 50(4) (1959). (Emphasis added.) The venue statute, itself, pro-
vides: "No ... judgment ... is void because rendered in the wrong venue, except in case of
judgment by confession as provided in section 50(4) .... ." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 8(1)
(1959). The exception for confession judgments was added in the general revision of the civil
practice code in 1955. Ill. Laws 1955, § 8(1), at 2241. In Wlodek v. Sedlacek, 30 Ill. App. 2d
351, 174 N.E.2d 705 (1961), the court held, in a syllabus opinion, that a cognovit judgment
should be vacated since the trial court had no jurisdiction and the judgment was void when
none of the three statutory requirements-execution, residence, or property--occurred in the
county.
Although the Municipal Court of Chicago, in which most cognovit judgments are taken,
requires, in the printed form used for filing claims on cognovits, that the attorney swear that
one of the three venue requirements exist, there is doubt as to whether in the municipal court
the venue requirements are jurisdictional. See Mitchell v. Comstock, 305 l. App. 360, 27
N.E.2d 620 (1940). One of the sections of the Code providing for the Municipal Court of
Chicago states: "No summons ... need be issued or served in the case of the confession of a
judgment ... but, such judgment may be confessed in the same manner, as near as may be,
as in a similar case in the circuit court." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 395 (1959).
Even if the execution of the note in the county of judgment is jurisdictional, the Illinois
court has held that the place where the note is dated is presumptively the place of execution.
Mitchell v. Comstock, supra. In Turner v. Alton Banking & Trust Co., 181 F.2d 899 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 833, rehearing denied, 340 U.S. 885 (1950), the court, sitting as
an F2 court, found, citing Mitchell, supra, that the F1 record was sufficient when it showed
that the note was dated in the county where judgment was taken. Turner, supra, however,
was decided prior to the 1955 amendment. Although the status of these statutes is unclear,
certainly an F2 court might take evidence that a non-resident did not "execute" the note in
the county where the judgment was taken and hold that the defect, although appearing in a
venue statute, was jurisdictional. Cf. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935).
In Ohio there seems to be little authority. In Albert v. Sitton, 84 Ohio Abs. 414, 170 N.E.
2d 925 (C.P. Ct. 1959), the court, despite the fact that the note showed on its face that it was
made and payable in Ohio, found that it was actually signed and delivered in Indiana. The
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F2's determinations of Fl's choice of law rule.2 63
Once F2 has found Fl's choice of law rule, it may then proceed to apply the
three jurisdictional tests. The first two would seemingly merge together in
practice. Fl's choice of law rule, in theory at least, explicitly refers to factual
contact points. F2 examines Fl's rule and finds, for instance, that Fl says
place of making and that where the note is signed is the place of making. F2
then determines the fact-where was the note signed-and applies the rule,
i.e., uses the substantive law of that state. If that state finds cognovits valid, Fl
has jurisdiction. Since Fl states do not always refer to their own law,264 F2
will frequently be free to refuse to give full faith and credit to the Fl judg-
ment.
The third attack available to an F2 court is that the Fl choice of law rule is
unconstitutional. Here F2 argues that the United States Supreme Court would
find that Fl's rule violates due process or the full faith and credit to public acts
requirement.265 A separate article would be needed to discuss the extent to
which the Supreme Court has been willing or might be willing in the future to
use either due process or full faith and credit as a means of controlling state
court said, finding no Ohio law in point, that the law of the place of making controlled and,
since Indiana prohibited cognovits, the cognovit was void.
The Albert case was decided on May 20, 1959. On June 8, 1959, the Ohio legislature
amended the provision allowing an attorney to confess judgment to add the phrase: "which
shall be in the county where the maker resides or in the county where the maker or any one
of several makers signed the warrant of attorney authorizing confession of judgment, any
agreement to the contrary notwithstanding." Ohio Laws 1959, at 137, now appearing as
OHIO Rav. CODE ANN. § 2323.13 (Baldwin 1960). Whether the legislature intended to make
this amendment jurisdictional is unknown. At least an F2 court could so argue. The amend-
ment was probably passed to combat the practice of Pennsylvania creditors confessing judg-
ment in Ohio to gain advantage of Ohio's more favorable garnishment laws. See text follow-
ing note 83 supra. At least Ohio's act reads "signed." Illinois' act, supra, only reads "exe-
cuted."
In Pennsylvania in Krantz v. Kazenstein, 22 Pa. Super. 275 (1903), the court held that
the law of the place of payment, which apparently was Pennsylvania, controlled as against
the place of dating and execution, New York. No venue restriction appears in the Pennsyl-
vania statute, PA. STAT. Am. tit. 12, § 739 (Supp. 1960). For the few cases from other
states see Annqt., 19 A.L.R.2d 544 (1951).
263 Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59 (1938). Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958) makes
clear that F2 is free to rely on past Fl Supreme Court determinations on the state of Fl's law.
This should dispel any jurisprudential argument that the trial court, in rendering judgment,
necessarily determined the choice of law rule for Fl and that that choice of law rule pointed
to a state substantive law which rendered the cognovit consent valid. Actually in a judgment
on confession, the trial court judge, according to Elledge, note 25 supra and accompanying
text, merely signs the judgment role at the bottom of each page. He makes no determination
of choice of law or anything else.
264 See note 262 supra.
265 This is a separate and distinct due process argument from that used at the start of the
section. There the argument turned on the validity of consent as ajurisdictional basis and the
lack of notice. Here it is a question of the validity of the choice of law rule. See generally
authorities note 266 infra.
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choice of law rules. The topic is current and many law professors are arguing
the relative merits of Supreme Court dominance. 266 The Supreme Court itself
is gun shy267 and has in recent years generally backed off.268 There is no indi-
cation that the Court will seek to establish a detailed control. As long as F1
has sufficient contact with the transaction to make it "reasonable" to apply its
own law, 269 the Supreme Court would not find such a choice in violation of
due process.270 Any contact point that would sustain in personam jurisdiction
should be sufficient for choice of law. If all F1 needs is one contact point, or a
"governmental interest," 27' F2 will find it difficult to refuse the F1 judgment
on this ground. Surely, in almost all cases, F1 will be the domicile of the
lender or the place of payment.272 It is remotely conceivable that F1 might
choose a sister state's substantive law to validate the consent when that state
'had no contact or interest in the transaction. In this unlikely event, Fl's choice
266 See, e.g., EHRENZwEIG § 9; Currie, The Constitution and the "Transitory" Cause of
Action (pts. 1-2), 73 HA{v. L. REv. 36,268 (1959); Currie, The Constitution andthe Choice of
Law: Governmental Interests and the Judicial Function, 26 U. Cm. L. REv. 9 (1958); Wein-
traub, Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Limitations on a State's Choice of Law, 44 IowA
L. REV. 449 (1959). Other clauses of the U.S. Constitution may limit state action. See
Currie & Schreter, Unconstitutional Discriminations in the Conflict of Laws: Equal Protection,
28 U. CHi. L. REv. 1 (1960); Currie & Schreter, Unconstitutional Discrimination and the
Conflict of Laws: Privileges and Immunities, 69 YAL W. 1323 (1960).
267 Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960).
268 See EHRNZWEIG § 9.
269 If Fl does apply its own law it is, in effect, adopting a choice of law rule that points
to Fl.
270 An early note on cognovits, Note, Due Process and the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 34
YALE LJ. 886 (1925), suggested that if the F1 choice of law rule was "reasonable," it would
not violate due process. Apparently reasonableness should be tested by whether Fl was a
contact point. Professor Paulsen points out, Paulsen, Enforcing the Money Judgment of a
Sister State, 42 IowA L. Rv. 202 (1957), that if Fl has no contact point, the use of its own
law would violate due process. He cites Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930). Id. at
210 n.38. Professor Currie would, apparently, test "reasonableness" in terms of "govern-
mental interest." Under such a view, the existence of a contact point would not be con-
trolling. Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the
Judicial Function, 26 U. CHr. L. Rv. 9 (1958). However, Fl could not claim the right to use
its own law merely because cognovits concern local procedure. See Currie, supra at 44.
Note also that this argument is basically the same as used by the Supreme Court in Grover
& Baker Mach. Co. v. Radcliffe, 137 U.S. 287 (1890). There the Court found lack of legisla-
tive jurisdiction when Pennsylvania attempted to apply its law to interpret the grant of
power in the consent. See note 224 supra and accompanying text. Here, however, the contact
point is needed for choice of law, not to interpret the grant of power. Yet both defects are
grounded on defeating the reasonable expectation of the defendant.
271 See generally Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests
and the Judicial Function, 26 U. Cm. L. Rav. 9 (1958).
272 It is conceivable that a lender in a state prohibiting cognovits might establish a prac-
tice of taking such judgments to Pennsylvania, obtain his judgment, and then re-sue in his
home state. Although there is some evidence of this practice, see text following note 83 supra,
the lender could establish a branch office and the place of payment in Pennsylvania, See note
85 supra and accompanying text,
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would probably violate due process. 27 3 The Court has, on occasion, demanded
that a state give full faith and credit to a particular foreign substantive law;
today it is extremely unlikely that it will do so in the cognovit situation. There
are no special equities requiring one and only one law to govern. 274
With so little help from the Supreme Court and with the facts in favor of
Fl, F2 will find the third ground-the unconstitutionality of Fl's choice of
law rule-of little help.
This review of the constitutional approaches to Fl cognovit judgments
leads to three conclusions. First, F2 courts are wrongly applying the full faith
and credit clause. F2 courts are giving full faith and credit to F1 judgments
when they are under no obligation to do so. 275 They are refusing to give full
faith and credit when they should.276 Or they are completely ignoring one
whole set of requirements that might or might not require full faith and cred-
it.277 Second, the rules for the proper application of full faith and credit in this
area are extremely involved and theoretical. Consequently, most borrower's
attorneys will be unable to research and argue the proper rule to the F2 court.
Third, the existing confusion allows F2 courts, with relative safety, to ma-
nipulate the rules to give effect to their local policy toward cognovit clauses
and adhesion contracts. This desire is understandable and probably not con-
demnable. But it perverts the proper desire of the United States Supreme Court
to weld fifty states into one nation through the use of the full faith and credit
clause.
CONCLUSION
The current drive of the United States Supreme Court to increase the right
of courts to exercise in personam jurisdiction is comnmendable. Forum non
conveniens should ultimately become the test. But this drive does not serve its
function of "balancing the conveniences" when the stay-at-home plaintiff is
not the little man. Here the finance company, through use of an adhesion con-
tract and traditional thinking, has been able to take judgment against a non-
resident who had but limited contact with the state where judgment was ren-
dered. Yet the Supreme Court would not and probably should not use the
balancing test solely in terms of the resources of the respective parties. If a
27- See Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law- Governmental Interests and the
.udicialFunction, 26 U. Cm. L. REv. 9, 16 (1958).
274 See articles note 266 supra for a review of the Supreme Court cases.
275 The refusal of F2 to check the local jurisdictional law of Fl is the best example.
276 The narrow construction of the consent when the law of Fl gives a broader construc-
tion and has legislative jurisdiction, and the using of an F2 choice of law rule to determine
the "proper" law of the consent in order to find it void are the best examples.
277 F2's consistent refusal to check Fl's choice of law rule is the example. When F2's rule
refers to a state prohibiting cognovits, it will render Fl's judgment void.
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little defendant deals with a foreign finance company he has had contact with
the foreign state. As long as "contact" is basically the test of "reasonable-
ness," the small defendant is caught. 278
A recent West Virginia case illustrates this point and makes another. In
Gavenda Bros. v. Elkins Limestone Co.,279 the West Virginia Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of the broad Illinois jurisdictional statute280 when
applied to a non-resident defendant who gave a note for the purchase of mer-
chandise in Illinois. The court found that this was sufficient contact and gave
full faith and credit to the judgment. At the end of the opinion, the court ob-
serves that the note contained a cognovit clause. The court said: "[Tihe plain-
tiff... could have obtained a valid judgment by confession... if it had
elected to have obtained jurisdiction in that manner." 281
According to the West Virginia court the plaintiff had two equally valid
choices. But there is one fundamental difference between the two methods of
obtaining jurisdiction. Under the statute, notice is required. Under a cognovit,
the defendant waives notice. There can be no valid reason to require notice in
the first case and not in the second. Illinois should be able to render judgment
in either case only after the defendant has a chance to put in a defense.
Beyond inherent fairness, to require notice would have other beneficial re-
sults. First, it would help clean up the full faith and credit mess. The finance
industry, already half convinced that cognovits are bad, would turn, at least as
to non-residents, to the new Illinois type statute to obtain their jurisdiction.282
F2 courts and borrowers' attorneys are able to handle these statutes under the
full faith and credit clause. Second, in addition to protecting the citizens of the
three states where cognovits are used for non-notice judgments, it might in-
duce the legislatures of those states to abolish cognovits entirely.283
278 But see Allied Finance Co. v. Prosser, 103 Ga. App. 538, 119 S.E.2d 813 (1961),
where the Georgia court was willing to deny full faith and credit to a Texas judgment on
the ground that the giving of a note in the purchase of an automobile was not suflicient
"doing business" to allow Texas, under the fourteenth amendment, to acquire in personam
jurisdiction over the individual borrower. Perhaps the smallness of the defendant is an
element of "reasonableness."
279 116 S.E.2d 910 (W. Va. 1960).
280 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 16, 17 (1959).
281 116 S.E.2d at 921.
232 Even if notice is not required, this movement to the new basis of jurisdiction as typi-
fied by the Illinois statute. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 16, 17 (1959), will probably also be
the result of the new venue restrictions placed on cognovit judgments by Illinois and Ohio in
recent years. See note 262 supra. Even if these restrictions are not jurisdictional, there prob-
ably will be fewer judgments taken against non-residents in those once popular states.
283 Recent developments in both Ohio and Illinois indicate that the respective legislatures
of these two states are aware of the inherent unfairness of cognovit judgments. In 1959, Ohio
limited venue for cognovit judgments. Ohio Laws 1959, p. 137, now appearing as OHIo REV.
CODE ANN. § 2323.13 (Baldwin 1960). See note 262 supra. In 1961, Illinois through a rather
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Some state supreme court must now take the first step and declare a non-
notice cognovit judgment unconstitutional. Then the United States Supreme
Court would have a chance to affirm.
The attorney later called up Joe. "Good news! The United States Supreme
Court just threw out judgments where notice wasn't given. You won't have
to pay Friendly Fmance twice."
strange procedure prohibited using cognovit judgment as "the basis for seeking a deduction
order" unless the judgment was confirmed by a trial de novo before which the plaintiff had to
attempt to give notice. A gentle push from the United States Supreme Court might be suf-
ficient to induce these legislatures to abolish cognovits entirely.
